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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its onset at the 1976 Pound Conference, the modern dispute resolu-
tion movement has been characterized by a spirit of innovation.1  Different
processes.  Different applications.  Different styles.  Different combinations of
the above, all in the service of “[f]itting the [f]orum to the [f]uss.”2  This is a
field in which the commitment to “think outside of the box” is more than a
mantra.  It is a way of being.
This dynamic raises the question of whether there is an outer boundary to
this creativity.  Shortly after the Pound Conference, often hailed as the begin-
ning of the modern Alternative Dispute Resolution movement, Professor Lon
Fuller argued that there is indeed such a limit, that there can be “danger” in
mixing processes, and he warned of the need not to stretch dispute resolution
processes too far beyond their essential capacities.3
In my view, the papers presented at this Symposium on “Rethinking the
Federal Arbitration Act” by three distinguished scholars—Professors Jeffrey
Stempel, Sarah Cole, and Chris Drahozal—point to the wisdom of Fuller’s
admonition.4  While they come from very different points of underlying politi-
cal philosophy, Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal collectively argue that
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Missouri School of Law.  I thank Robert Bailey, Chris Drahozal, Sarah Cole, E. Ray Lanier,
Jeff Stempel, Jean Sternlight, Steve Ware, and the Quinnipiac University School of Law
faculty for their comments on an earlier draft.  I also thank the John W. Cowden Faculty
Research Fellowship, the W. Dudley McCarter Faculty Research Fellowship, the Thompson
Coburn Faculty Development Fund, and the Missouri Law School Foundation for the
financial support that made it possible to develop this work.
1 See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 677-790 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing “mixed processes, adaptations, and other innovations” in dispute
resolution).
2 Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss:  A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).
3 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 396 (1978)
[hereinafter Fuller, Forms]; see also Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitra-
tor, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 23 (noting key distinctions between arbitration and mediation, and
expressing skepticism about combining the procedures).  For an excellent discussion of
Fuller’s views on the various processes of dispute resolution, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Mothers and Fathers of Invention:  The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 1, 13-22 (2000).
4 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8
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the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) should be amended to permit a greater
role for the courts in binding arbitration by easing the restrictions on finality
and either requiring or permitting substantive judicial review of arbitration
awards.  Professor Stempel makes the broadest argument, contending that all
arbitration awards should be subject to substantive judicial review similar to
that of public trial courts.  Professor Cole argues that substantive review should
be permitted when the parties agree to it by contract,5 which I call “contracted
judicial arbitration.”  Professor Drahozal takes a narrower approach, arguing
that substantive review of arbitration awards should be available for arbitral
awards that are in manifest disregard of the law, thus generally codifying a
widely held common law view.
While all of the arguments they present are plausible and have their com-
pelling points, they nonetheless miss the mark, and rather widely.  In my view,
the displacement of finality with substantive judicial review, if codified, will
greatly undermine the arbitration process, its attractiveness as an alternative to
public adjudication or negotiated settlement, and its utility as an aid to the judi-
ciary as a forum for the expeditious resolution of disputes.6  Rather than requir-
ing or permitting substantive judicial review, in my view the FAA should
maintain its current narrow grounds for substantive review and be amended to
resolve a split in the lower courts, to make clear that parties cannot contract for
substantive judicial review, and to reaffirm that the arbitration of disputes is to
be based on the actual assent of the parties.
The question is important, arousing fire and passion in the arbitration com-
munity nearly as great as the ultimate lightning rod of mandatory arbitration.
Moreover, the stakes have grown since these scholars raised it at this Sympo-
sium.  Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have
announced that they will decide the question raised by Professor Cole:  whether
parties can contract for substantive review of arbitration awards by the federal
courts.7  In both cases, the lower courts refused to enforce the judicial review
provision.
Judicial review of contracted substantive review is long overdue.  The
question has fractured the lower state and federal courts, and parties are entitled
to guidance with respect to the reach of their power to shape their arbitrations.
However it is relatively tangential to our inquiry here because the task before
us in this Symposium is whether and how the FAA should be amended by
Congress.  At least in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel Inc., the statute itself is the primary source of law, and as I discuss
further below, the substantive review question is of such magnitude that it
should be decided by Congress itself rather than relying on judicial gap-filling.
NEV. L.J. 234 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo
Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007).
5 Such review would be available as long as it does not impinge upon the institutional
integrity of the courts. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
6 For a historical and doctrinal assessment of the importance of finality to the arbitration
process, see Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl:  Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 133-77 (2002).
7 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 2875 (2007); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187 (Ct.
App. 2006), cert. granted, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006).
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As I and others have long lamented, the FAA has already seen too much of
that.8  Indeed, the very opportunity here is to discuss how those judicial errors
and excesses might be corrected in light of the eighty-plus years since the FAA
was enacted, not to square the statute with the legal process nightmare that has
been the U.S. Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence for the last half century.9
With an important new scholarly work dedicated to the task of identifying
issues for a comprehensive revision of the FAA,10 new legislation to amend the
act proposed again in 2007,11 and a Democratic Congress for the first time in a
decade, there is perhaps reason to believe some momentum may actually
develop.
In Part II of this Comment, I lay out a “process characteristic and value”
approach to the legitimacy of innovation that can be applied generally to varia-
tions in dispute resolution processes.  Using these process characteristics and
values helps define dispute resolution processes so that consumers can more
clearly distinguish among them and choose the process that they feel is most
appropriate for their dispute.  While fussing over labels for processes might
seem a bit wooden and formalistic, labels can be important in dispute resolu-
tion, both for the legitimacy of the process as well as its legal and ethical conse-
quences.   For example, whether a meeting between two parties convened by a
state court judge seeking to facilitate settlement is subject to California state
mediation confidentiality protections depends upon whether the meeting is
classified as a “settlement conference” or a “judicial mediation.”12  Similarly,
whether an informal adjudicatory hearing is an “arbitration” for purposes of the
Federal Arbitration Act’s enforcement powers is another example.
I then apply this analysis to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,
and demonstrate how these process characteristics and values are embodied in
the Federal Arbitration Act as a holistic, integrated statute intended and
designed to preserve and support party choices to use arbitration to resolve
commercial disputes.  In Part III, I describe the proposed arbitration reforms by
Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal and then, in Part IV, demonstrate why
8 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 333-39; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017,
1036-37 (1996) (contending mandatory arbitration agreements are the “yellow dog” con-
tracts of the 1990s because of their potential to limit employment to those workers willing to
waive their legal rights as a condition of employment). See generally IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:  REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
172-73 (1992) (arguing that judicial policy on ADR is motivated by judicial self-interest in
reducing caseloads).
9 See infra Part IV.D.  For a proposal to bring the FAA more into line with the case law, see
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Story of Arbitration Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 299, 321-23 (2003).
10 EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN H. WARE,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) [hereinafter ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA].
11 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (barring predispute agreements to arbitrate employ-
ment, consumer, and franchisee claims and repealing the federal doctrine of separability).
12 Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).  For a
criticism, see Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges
Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 336, 367-78.
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they frustrate rather than further the process characteristics and values of arbi-
tration under the FAA, and why adjudicatory hearings conducted according to
those proposals should not be considered “arbitrations” for purposes of the pro-
tections and supports of the FAA.  Contracted substantive review presents addi-
tional complexities because of the importance of the freedom of contract, which
is vital to arbitration but which I contend is also subject to constraint by the
other process characteristics and values of arbitration under the FAA, as well as
pragmatic concerns.  Finally, I conclude by recommending that the bases for
judicial review of arbitration awards be limited to those explicitly specified in
section 10 of the original Act13 and by urging Congress to make clear that
arbitrations with expanded review provisions are not arbitrations for purposes
of the protections and supports of the Federal Arbitration Act.14  I also recom-
mend that Congress amend the FAA to make clear that arbitration under the
Act must be based on an actual agreement to arbitrate in order to ameliorate
some of the underlying concerns that may in part be animating these proposals.
II. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK:  INNOVATION AND ARBITRATION
A. Core Process Characteristics and Values:  A General Approach
Innovation is a cherished tradition within dispute resolution.  Indeed, the
period after Frank E.A. Sander’s legendary Pound Conference speech15 is often
referred to as the period of experimentation, during which the pioneers of the
field tried a number of different approaches to dispute resolution.16  For exam-
ple, courts tried several different approaches to promoting settlement, in addi-
tion to settlement conferences, such as early neutral evaluation and summary
jury trials.17  In the private sector, too, different techniques were fashioned in
the service of settlement, such as the mini-trial and the combination of media-
tion and arbitration (“med-arb”).18  Different approaches to mediation emerged,
such as what has come to be known as evaluative mediation, facilitative media-
tion, and transformative mediation.19  Arbitration, too, was adapted into differ-
ent forms, such as baseball arbitration and high-low arbitration.20
13 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
14 Professor Schmitz first proposed this remedy for arbitrations with expanded review provi-
sions. See Schmitz, supra note 6, at 178-202.
15 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
16 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 9 (5th ed. 2007) (describing how the focus of ADR statutes and
commentary shifted from “experimentation to institutionalization”); Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:  Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from
a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 243 (2002).
17 See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 714-22.
18 Id. at 762-77.
19 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (articulating
transformative theory of mediation); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out:
Is This the End of “Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Leonard L.
Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:  A Grid for the
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).
20 See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 42-49 (2005); RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 658.
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This was, and continues to be, an exciting component of the dispute reso-
lution field, with such processes as collaborative and cooperative law coming to
the fore.21  Yet it does not lend itself to clear, bright lines in terms of the dis-
tinctions between these processes.  The difference between evaluative media-
tion and early neutral evaluation is fine indeed, and while it may be perceptible
to the ultra-sophisticated few, it is easily confusing to consumers and often
does not reflect what actually happens in practice.22  More significantly per-
haps, the legal and ethical treatment of a dispute resolution process varies
depending upon the name or nature of the process.  For example, the Uniform
Mediation Act’s confidentiality privilege applies only to proceedings that meet
the statute’s definition of mediation.23
This dynamic has also led to bitter conflict within these specialty areas
over the right to claim the franchise, especially those that are more consensu-
ally oriented—a seemingly formalistic point, but important nonetheless, partic-
ularly to new or adaptive processes seeking legitimacy and the protections or
obligations of formal law that might be available to the primary process.
Facilitative mediators often contend evaluative mediation was not mediation at
all, for example,24 although the heat from that debate has abated in recent
years.  Similarly, classical ombudsmen often do not view organizational
ombudsmen as meriting the title “ombudsman.”  And both of them have
problems with advocacy ombudsmen calling themselves “ombudsmen”!25
The result has been that the very innovative spirit that has led to the pro-
cess flexibility and adaptation that has been vital to the expansion of the field
has also led to confusion and acrimony that has created misunderstanding, dis-
sipated energy, and spoiled professional relationships.  Professor Fuller warned
of this potential when he encouraged early thinkers about dispute resolution to
recognize that each dispute resolution process has its own internal structure,
21 For a recent discussion, see David Hoffman, Colliding Worlds in Dispute Resolution,
2008 J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming) (describing such seemingly odd dispute resolution
hybrids as adversarial collaboration, meditative litigation, and medicollab). See also John
Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007) (decrying tendency toward rules rather than norms
for new ADR processes).  For the seminal elaboration of collaborative lawyering, see PAU-
LINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW:  ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE
WITHOUT LITIGATION (2001). For a scholarly treatment of ethical and other issues raised by
collaborative law, see John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law:  Ethics and Practice
of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315 (2003).
22 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic:  Liberating ADR from Ideology,
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 247.
23 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 2(1)-(2), 4(a) (2001).
24 See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymo-
ron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten
Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1997).
25 The relatively recent American Bar Association Standards for the Establishment and
Operation of Ombuds Offices takes the bold step of explicitly recognizing all of these forms
of ombuds, which is one reason they have been controversial within the ombuds field. See
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES
(2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].  For a critique, see Kevin Jessar, The Ombuds’ Per-
spective:  A Critical Analysis of the ABA 2004 Ombuds Standards, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Aug.–Oct. 2005, at 56.
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logic, and morality.26  Failing to do so, he said, would lead to confusion, ill-
fitting processes, and unsatisfactory results.27
Drawing on Fuller’s prescient insight, or perhaps restating it to some
degree, I would like to propose, at the risk of being somewhat formalistic, that
at least some of the problem can be eased, if not resolved, by reference to the
defining characteristics and process values of the dispute resolution process
being adapted, and concomitantly, the clear labeling of adapted processes.  That
is to say, if a proposed adaptation of a dispute resolution process is so signifi-
cant that the resulting process no longer substantially shares the core character-
istics and values of the original process—or worse yet, undermines them—then
it simply would not be appropriate to consider and call the derivative process
by the name of the original process.28
On the other hand, if the proposed adaptation still substantially shares the
core characteristics and values of the original process, then it would be appro-
priate to consider and call the new process by the name of the other, but per-
haps with some distinguishing modifier to provide more information to
consumers of the process.  For example, it is appropriate, in my view, to con-
sider and call evaluative mediation “mediation” because it shares the essential
process values of mediation:  a process of confidential dialogue between the
parties, party self-determination as to result, and a helping rather than deci-
sional role for the third party neutral.  By the same analysis, it is much more
difficult to consider an “advocacy ombudsman” an “ombudsman” because the
advocacy ombudsman does not share one of the core characteristics and values
of an ombudsman:  neutrality.29  The advocacy ombudsman’s role is to advo-
cate on behalf of a client or a particular class of clients, not neutrally facilitate
process.30  Perhaps the label “advocate” might be more suitable for that form of
dispute resolution professional.
The approach I am suggesting is not absolute—that is to say, I am not
contending that all process characteristics of the adapted process need to square
precisely with all process characteristics of the initial process.  Such a require-
ment would stifle rather than promote creativity.  Rather, I think it is a matter
of degree:  The more the proposed adaptation departs from or undermines core
process values, the less appropriate it is for the new process to carry the mantle
of legitimacy, and related legal protections, enjoyed by the old.  For this reason,
public policy mediation in my view would still be entitled to be considered and
called “mediation,” even though many public policy mediations deviate from
mediation norms in that they often are not conducted confidentially or their
results are made public.  In my view, they are still “mediations” because they
are structured in such a way as to preserve the other essential characteristics of
26 See Fuller, Forms, supra note 3, at 356 (“Our task is to separate the tosh from the
essential.”).
27 See id. at 393-409.
28 For another functional approach, see Schmitz, supra note 6, at 157-66.
29 See INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS (2007) (“Neutrality and Impartiality.
The Ombudsman, as a designated neutral, remains unaligned and impartial.  The
Ombudsman does not engage in any situation which could create a conflict of interest.”);
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25, § C(2) (“The ombuds conducts inquiries and investiga-
tions in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest.”).
30 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25, § J.
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the mediation process in terms of the dialogic nature of the process itself, the
structure of the decision-making process, and the role of the third party neutral
in facilitating consensus.
This approach, of course, calls initially for the identification of core pro-
cess characteristics and values.  Reasonable minds may differ on the goals or
functioning of a dispute resolution process, but my idea of core characteristics
and process values is one that should be capable of attracting more consensus,
at least in terms of concept if not precise language.31  In particular, I suggest
that the core characteristics and values of a dispute resolution process can be
identified and assessed by reference to at least ten different dimensions:  level
of formality, efficiency, the decision maker, standards for decision, form of
decision, enforceability of decision, finality of decision, privacy, party auton-
omy, and civility.32  In the next Section, I apply these dimensions to arbitration
under the FAA to identify the “core process characteristics and values” of the
arbitration process under the FAA.
B. The Core Process Characteristics and Values of Commercial Arbitration
The analysis of FAA arbitration under these criteria reveals many reasons
why disputants might elect to choose or reject arbitration as a means to resolve
their disputes.  Significantly, these characteristics and values often differ mark-
edly from public adjudication, even though arbitration, like public trial, is an
adjudicatory process in which a third party neutral decides the outcome of a
dispute.  It is in this very way that arbitration provides a meaningful and impor-
tant alternative to trial for disputants who want binding and enforceable adjudi-
cation but without some of the obligations of public trial.
1. Preliminary Considerations
A few caveats are in order before proceeding with the analysis.  First, even
within the sphere of FAA arbitration, there is a wide range of practices that
influence how these process dimensions function in any particular arbitration or
industry-specific approach to arbitration.  Moreover, the nature of arbitration
under the FAA has evolved over time.  In some contexts, such as securities33
and complex commercial cases, arbitration has become highly formalized, with
routine discovery and motion practice, the application of substantive legal
rules, and written and reasoned awards.34  Other contexts remain less formal,
such as garden-variety consumer and employment claims.  Second, parties are
31 See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 3-5 (1997); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 16, at 4-5; RISKIN
ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
32 The order here is intended to further analytic goals, not to establish any sense of priority
or relative weight.
33 For a discussion of the formalization, or “judicialization” of arbitration within the securi-
ties industry, see generally Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitra-
tion, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (1996).
34 See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitra-
tion, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52-61 (1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR
and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:  Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 334-42 (1996) (distinguishing between old
and new arbitration).
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generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit,35 and
those preferences can affect the level of formality and other process character-
istics and values of arbitration; it is this freedom that in part has led to the
innovation previously described.  Finally, any potential realization of the vir-
tues of arbitration necessarily depends on the parties themselves.  Parties and
counsel can be just as obstreperous in arbitration as in public adjudication, thus
undermining the virtues of arbitration.36
It is therefore hazardous to generalize about the application of these crite-
ria to FAA arbitration in general—and point to the wisdom of Professor Stipa-
nowich’s admonition in this Symposium to think discretely about arbitration
processes under the FAA, as we should with other dispute resolution
processes.37  Still, there is benefit to a generalized understanding as well, both
in terms of conceptualizing a “big picture” through which individual nuance
can be identified and appreciated, and in providing at least something of a base-
line for comparing arbitration under the FAA to other dispute resolution
processes, such as public adjudication.
It is with these caveats in mind that I proceed to describe the application of
these process dimensions in the FAA arbitration context.  The order is in terms
of logical sequencing, not in terms of importance, as the importance of any one
of these considerations may be dominant in a particular disputant’s decision to
choose arbitration.
2. The Process Characteristics and Values of Commercial Arbitration
a. Level of Formality
One of the most significant ways that arbitration differs from public trial is
in the level of formality that attends the proceedings.38  Public trial is a
paradigmatically formal process, in which substantive and procedural rules are
strictly observed.  The process itself is generally governed by state or federal
rules of civil procedure as well as local court rules.  State or federal rules of
evidence generally govern the admissibility of evidence within the process.
Similarly, substantive law standards derived from statutes, constitutions, or the
common law provide a basis for decision making, while notions of due process
provide a pervasive norm for procedural standards.
When compared to public adjudication, arbitration is generally a more
informal process.39  Unless the parties agree otherwise, the rules of civil proce-
35 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
36 See, e.g., Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 2005) (dispute
over the award of punitive damages in arbitration appealed twice, only to have the arbitral
award reaffirmed).  For a discussion, see Leonard Post, Case Pits Courts v. Arbitration,
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 17, 2005, at 1.
37 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra:  Arbitration Law and the Rap-
idly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427 (2007).
38 As Grant Gilmore famously observed, “The worse the society, the more law there will be.
In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.”  Grant
Gilmore, Editors’ Introduction, The Storrs Lectures:  The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022,
1044 (1975).
39 It should be emphasized that sophisticated commercial arbitrations can be quite formal in
their structure and operation.
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dure and evidence generally do not apply, thus permitting arbitrators to con-
sider hearsay and other evidence that may not be available in public
adjudication.  Although discovery is available, it typically is not used as much
as in court proceedings.40  Nor is extensive motion practice generally wide-
spread in arbitration.41  The limited review of arbitration awards by courts, dis-
cussed further below, discourages costly and time-consuming appeals. These
and other differences arising from the informal nature of arbitration create the
potential for saving time and money.42
b. Efficiency (Time and Money)
The potential for efficiency has been an important virtue of commercial
arbitration throughout its Anglo-American history.  Arbitration became formal-
ized in the commercial context with the rise of the craftsmen’s gilds and Court
Merchant fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.43  Efficiency was particu-
larly important in these contexts because of the need of parties to get their
dispute resolved and move on with their lives.  The Court Merchant fairs, for
example, involved itinerant merchants who traveled from town fair to town fair
peddling their wares.  Speed of resolution and finality of result, discussed fur-
ther below, were particularly important to these traveling merchants because
they were often in a community only for a short period of time.44
Today, the potential efficiency advantages of speedy resolution and lower
costs continue to be among the more compelling reasons parties have for
choosing arbitration.  Simply put, arbitration can be faster and cheaper than the
courts, in part because it averts the long waiting time for a trial in some juris-
dictions, the large legal and expert witness fees generated by extensive pre-trial
discovery and long, complex trials, and the delay to the implementation of an
adjudicatory decision that can be caused by appeals.45
40 See W. Michael Tupman, Discovery and Evidence in U.S. Arbitration:  The Prevailing
Views, ARB. J., Mar. 1989, at 27.
41 See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 512-15.
42 It also has been argued that informality can promote a perception of greater fairness and
increase the satisfaction of those who participate in the proceedings.  One study, for exam-
ple, indicated that frustration and dissatisfaction result from constraints placed on witnesses’
ability to tell their stories in their own ways and their inability to understand courts’ explana-
tions about why their narratives are unacceptable.  William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley,
Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 661, 665-72 (1985).
43 Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 132, 133-34 (1934).
44 The readily available literature makes clear that the Law Merchants handled disputes
within the community of traveling merchants.  See, e.g., one English scholar’s assertion that
before Lord Coke became Lord Chief Justice in 1609 “you will find the Law Merchant as a
special law administered by special Courts for a special class of people.”  Thomas Edward
Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7, 9 (1909).  See generally JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 71-83 (1918).  Less clear, however, is whether they
also handled customer complaints.  Common sense suggests they may have in some
instances as a practical matter, but that those efforts would have been merely incidental to
their central role of resolving disputes among merchants.
45 It is important to note, however, that these alleged advantages are potential rather than
guaranteed, and will be fully realized only if the parties cooperate in using their freedom to
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c. The Decision Maker
Like public trial, arbitration is an adjudicatory process in which the basic
function of the third party neutral is to decide the dispute, an important distinc-
tion from the more facilitative function of a third party neutral in a consensual
process.  However, the decision maker in commercial arbitration is distin-
guished from the decision maker in public adjudication in other important
respects.  In public adjudication, parties are assigned a judge, for example,
while in arbitration the parties select their own arbitrator.  This distinction in
the method of selecting the adjudicator has important consequences.
Most judges in courts of general jurisdiction have a general legal back-
ground and by virtue of many years of training and practice are highly skilled
in legal analysis and the art of applying general rules of law to specific factual
situations.46  By contrast, arbitrators are “men of affairs,”47 and are often
selected because of their expertise and experience with respect to the subject
matter of the dispute under submission, or because of other characteristics the
parties desire in a decision maker, such as a particular educational or profes-
sional background, stature within a relevant community, or a reputation for
good judgment
d. Standard for Decision
The rule of law commands that public courts use the law as the basis for
decision making. Moreover, through the doctrine of stare decisis and the princi-
ple of precedent, courts are bound by superior judicial interpretations of the law
in cases that are similar to the one before them.  The failure to apply the law
properly is probably the most common basis for the reversal of public judicial
decisions.
By contrast, while many do, commercial arbitrators generally are not
required to apply the law in rendering their decisions, absent specific instruc-
tions by the parties in their submission to arbitration.48  They need not even be
lawyers, although many are.49  Rather, the arbitrator is empowered to decide
the dispute on the basis of his or her best judgment, which can be predicated on
other standards that might be appropriate under the circumstances, such as
broad principles of equity and justice,50 industry standards and practices,51
pursue them.  For a discussion of ways to expedite the arbitration process, see Robert S.
Peckar, Making Commercial Arbitration Faster and More Efficient, ARB. J., Dec. 1991, at 5.
46 Administrative law judges and judges of special jurisdiction courts, such as the U.S. Tax
Court, often have more specialized knowledge to bring to public adjudication.
47 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring) (gender-specific reference in original).
48 For a meta-analysis of empirical support for the proposition that arbitration is “lawless,”
see Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 187 (2006).
49 Parties of course are free to instruct arbitrators to apply the law.  Moreover, the National
Arbitration Forum distinguishes itself in the brokerage services market by claiming that its
arbitrators are “former judges and experienced attorneys who hear and decide our cases
review the facts and render decisions based on known rules and substantive law.” See
National Arbitration Forum, Mission and Values, http://www.arb-forum.com/main.aspx?
itemID=4&hideBar=False&navID=18&news=3 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
50 See Muldrow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77 (1852).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ112.txt unknown Seq: 11 17-JAN-08 8:57
Fall 2007] PROCESS PURITY AND INNOVATION 281
community norms, or common sense.52  While law can be a consideration in an
arbitrator’s judgment, and frequently is, the commercial arbitrator’s decision is
at best “rough justice.”53 Some critics of mandatory arbitration suggest it is this
process characteristic and value that proponents seize upon, especially arbitra-
tion’s insulation of the dispute from consideration by a jury.54
e. Form of Decision
Public court judges are obligated to issue written and reasoned judicial
opinions that explain their significant decisions.  This is a vital function in the
public system of justice because it assures the accountability of public judges
and educates the public about rule of law norms.55  Written opinions compel
judges to explain their reasoning, which helps to sharpen their thinking and to
assure the decision is based on the proper law rather than other inappropriate or
arbitrary factors, such as personal preference or bias.  Written and reasoned
opinions also help explain and legitimize the work of the court in the eyes of
the parties and the public, thus supporting the rule of law that is essential to the
exercise of democratic governance.
Commercial arbitrators, however, are generally not required to provide the
reasoning for their decisions unless a written and reasoned decision is required
by the parties in their submission to arbitration.  Indeed, arbitrators historically
have been discouraged from providing written and reasoned opinions because
of the risk that such opinion might provide a basis for judicial review, thus
undermining the goal of finality.  In the last decade, though, arbitration service
providers have enacted rules directing arbitrators to write opinions unless the
parties otherwise agree.56
51 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:  Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 127 (1992) (Diamond merchant
arbitrators decided cases “on the basis of custom and usage, a little common sense, some
Jewish law, and, last, common-law legal principles.”).
52 This authority has a rich pedigree.  In the medieval Court Merchant Fairs, for example,
arbitrators used “fair law,” focusing on shared customs rather than formal law to decide
disputes, in part because commercial law had not yet developed. See COHEN, supra note 44,
at 136.
53 See Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes Employ-
ment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 111 (2002); Alan Scott Rau, Con-
tracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 239 (1997); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The Return of Unconscionability
Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757,
829 (2004).
54 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress
over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 563 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread
of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17 (2003).
55 For a discussion, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1082-91
(2000), and sources cited therein.
56 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R. 42(b) (2007)
[hereinafter AAA RULES] (“The arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the par-
ties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless the
arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.”); International Institute for Con-
flict Prevention and Resolution, Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration R. 14.2 (2005)
(“All awards shall be in writing and shall state the reasoning on which the award rests unless
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f. Enforceability of Decision
Like those of public judges, the decisions of commercial arbitrators are
fully enforceable by the public courts when the parties agree that the award is
to be binding, as contemplated by the FAA.  While straightforward, the point is
important because it is the enforceability of the agreement at law that provides
parties confidence in the arbitration process and builds efficiency into the pro-
cess.  Without enforceability, arbitrators would only be able to issue what in
effect would be advisory opinions.  To be sure, this can be beneficial in moving
the parties toward settlement, and may be a reason some parties may choose to
opt for non-binding arbitration.57  But if the parties want their dispute adjudi-
cated rather than settled, then enforceability is crucial because many parties can
reasonably be expected simply to ignore an adverse award if it is not binding.
g. Finality
Finality is a defining difference between commercial arbitration and pub-
lic adjudication, a structural characteristic that makes other process characteris-
tics and values possible and distinguishes arbitration from other dispute
resolution processes.  Public civil adjudication provides for an appellate pro-
cess for the review of trial level rulings.  The purpose of this review is to assure
the trial judge’s proper and accurate application of the law to the facts, not to
second-guess judges or juries on factual determinations.  Conversely, the deci-
sions of arbitrators are generally not subject to substantive review for correct-
ness or accuracy.  Indeed, the notion of substantive “correctness” or “accuracy”
historically has had little place in arbitration precisely because arbitration calls
for the exercise of worldly judgment that is informed by a variety of considera-
tions that may not lend themselves to an objective notion of correctness or
accuracy,58 such as knowledge of economic considerations in the securities
industry or professional standards and practices in the construction industry.
Federal and state courts alike have been consistent in their support of the final-
ity of arbitration, even refusing to disturb arbitration awards that are erroneous
on their face.59  This may seem like “rough justice,” but as the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted, “a party ‘trades the procedures and opportunity for
review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.’”60
the parties agree otherwise.”); JAMS, Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures R.
24(h) (2007) (“Unless all Parties agree otherwise, the Award shall also contain a concise
written statement of the reasons for the Award.”).
57 Arbitrations that are conducted under the authority of state and federal court programs are
generally non-binding because of constitutional and other legal concerns. See ELIZABETH
PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS:  A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS 4-5, 7 (1996).
58 Even courts can go only so far in assuring accuracy and correctness of judicial determina-
tions.  As Justice Jackson once famously said of the Supreme Court itself, “We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”  Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
59 Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992) (and sources cited therein).
60 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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h. Privacy
Unlike a public adjudication that is conducted in public sessions, the com-
mercial arbitration hearing is typically conducted in private and on private
property, allowing the parties to have some control over who has access to the
proceedings and the arbitrator’s award.61  Parties who believe that public
access to the hearing or decision might result in competitive or other disadvan-
tages may well consider arbitration’s relative privacy one of its significant
benefits.
i. Party Autonomy
Many of the foregoing potential advantages result from the autonomy par-
ties gain when they decide to engage in private ordering and arbitrate their
disputes rather than go to court for public ordering.62  As we have seen, when
parties arbitrate, they have power to decide for themselves many substantive
and procedural issues over which they would have no control if they used the
public court system.  The power to choose the neutral decision maker, for
example, is an important aspect of party autonomy.  The parties also may,
within limits, select the substantive standards that govern the arbitrator’s deci-
sion and the procedure for processing the dispute.  Party autonomy is supported
by the limited court review of arbitration awards.
j. Civility
It is no secret that public adjudication is often not for the faint-hearted.  It
is an adversarial process in which parties frequently engage in deceptive,
exploitive, “scorched Earth” tactics in pursuit of the edge that will bring them a
favorable settlement or a victory in the form of a favorable decision by the trier
of fact based on applicable law.63  Courts frequently have to admonish counsel
61 Trespass law would provide an adequate basis for controlling access to the arbitration.
The ability of parties to prevent the discoverability and admissibility of communications
made within an arbitration is much more constrained. See United States v. Panhandle E.
Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1988), aff’d, 868 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1989).  For a general
discussion, see Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration:  Beyond the Myth, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1255 (2006).
62 Professor Ware contends that party autonomy is the defining, most important of the pro-
cess characteristics and values, and that many of the other values I have described as values
of the arbitration process are, in fact, values of the people who choose the arbitration pro-
cess, not the process itself. See ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 339.  I
generally agree that autonomy is of seminal importance, often providing a rationale for other
process values. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:  The Problem
of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 285-87 (2004).
63 For general discussions of scorched Earth litigation, see, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON PROFES-
SIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:”  A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 3 (1986) (discussing “scorched Earth” civil litigation); Vincent
R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 811, 812-13
(1998) (noting the “commonplace” scorched Earth tactics in some fields of civil litigation);
Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators:  Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17
PEPP. L. REV. 637 (1990) (discussing melodramatic performances by trial lawyers).  For a
case study, see Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Conduct in the “Tobacco Wars,” 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 435, 435 (2001) (discussing how tobacco company lawyers engaged in “strategic and
abusive litigation conduct designed to delay trials, obstruct discovery of relevant documents,
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in order to preserve a sense of decorum about the proceedings, and sometimes
even must resort to their sanction powers to heel the overly zealous.64
Commercial arbitrations, on the other hand, are often more civil.  While
the reasons for this civility have not been given much consideration, at least
two possibilities may be supposed, both of which arise out of the previously
discussed virtues.  One possibility is that civility is a function of the informality
of the proceedings.  Unlike courts, in which parties struggle mightily over the
inclusion or exclusion of evidence, arbitration operates under a general rule of
free admissibility of evidence.  As a general matter, tendered evidence will be
received and considered “for what it is worth.”65  As a result, there may be a
somewhat diminished need for the kind of gamesmanship over evidence that is
often seen in public adjudication.  A second possibility may lie in the different
standards of decision available to courts and arbitrators.  In public adjudication,
courts are obligated to decide according to the application of the law to the
facts, regardless of the impressions the judge may have of counsel or the case.
Arbitrators, however, are not bound by legal rules and instead have broad dis-
cretion to decide the case as they see fit.  One can readily see how the fact of
this discretion, bolstered by the norm of finality, could have a tempering effect
on the nature of the tactics, discouraging the use of more confrontational tactics
for fear of arousing the anger of the decision maker.
3. Choosing Arbitration
All of these process characteristics and values are mutually reinforcing
and provide reasons why parties may choose to arbitrate their commercial dis-
putes rather than have them decided by a court of law if the parties want to
have their dispute decided by adjudication.  As such, the choice of arbitration
represents a trade-off in process characteristics and values, the determination
that in a given case one or more of the characteristics and values of arbitration
and run up the costs of the plaintiffs’ lawyers who finance these cases”).  For a discussion of
civility in arbitration, see Louis L.C. Chang, Keeping Arbitration Easy, Efficient, Economi-
cal and User Friendly, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2006, at 15, 16. (“Arbitrators can set the
tone for the arbitration by stating that they expect civility and cooperation from the parties
and their attorneys.”); Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration:  The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1, 55 (2006)
(“[I]n arbitration, the hyper-aggressive advocate is less effective than the advocate who is
civil.”).  To be sure, attorneys in arbitration can be just as contentious as in litigation.  For a
discussion of this problem in the securities industry, see Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kuper-
smith, Manners–The Return of Emily Post, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2001:  HOW DO I
DO IT?  HOW DO I DO IT BETTER? 35 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. B0-0158, 2001), WL 1264 PLI/Corp 35.
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 11, and related state laws, is one such tool.  Courts also claim inherent
power to sanction attorneys if necessary to control their dockets, see, e.g., Link v. Wabash
R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (sua sponte dismissal for want of prosecution), and to
supervise the members of the bar, see, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
764-67 (1980) (attorney’s fees assessed against counsel for bad faith failure to obey discov-
ery orders).
65 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 450 (Martin
M. Volz & Edward P. Coggin eds., 5th ed. 1997); see also AAA RULES, supra note 56, at R.
31(a); Survey Shows Arbitrators Agree on Thought and Practice of Work, Gov’t Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA), Dec. 10, 1984, at 2272 (A survey demonstrated that “the most experienced and
the busiest arbitrators have a tendency to admit disputed material into evidence ‘for what it is
worth.’”).
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are more suitable than the characteristics and values of public adjudication.
Crucially, in enacting the FAA, Congress made the determination that society
has a strong interest in providing the option of choosing binding arbitration as a
judicially enforceable means of resolving disputes,66 and in the next Section, I
demonstrate how the FAA conceived of arbitration in terms of these process
characteristics and values.
C. The Embodiment of Process Characteristics and Values in the FAA
The primary purpose of the FAA was narrow:  to repeal the centuries-old
“ouster” or “revocability” doctrine,67 under which both English and American
courts refused to enforce commercial agreements to arbitrate, and to compel the
federal courts to support the institution of arbitration according to the process
characteristics and values described above.68
Space does not permit comprehensive analysis, but even a brief overview
of the FAA demonstrates how the statute serves to fulfill this narrow purpose
by reinforcing commercial arbitration’s process characteristics and values in a
sophisticated, integrated statutory scheme.  Section 2, the heart of the act,
repeals the ouster doctrine and provides that agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable when they are contractually valid.69  Sections 370 and 471 require
66 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (Because the FAA establishes strong policy favoring arbitration, as a “matter of fed-
eral law, any doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”); see also Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 486, 490-91 (1987) (Disputes over commissions on securities sales
were arbitrable under a contract that provided for arbitration, even though the California
Labor Code mandated court litigation of such wage disputes, “despite the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 623 n.10 (1985) (antitrust claims arbitrable, notwithstanding Puerto Rican law
requiring judicial resolution).
67 MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 28-30. But see Brunet, supra note 34, at 79-80 (arguing that
the overriding purpose of the FAA was to advance party intent).
68 While the courts historically refused to enforce the agreement to arbitrate specifically,
they were willing to enforce an arbitration award issued pursuant to an agreement to arbi-
trate.  For a discussion, see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Action The-
ory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 598-602 (1997).
69 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
70 Section 3 applies to cases that have been filed in court, providing:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
Id. § 3.
71 Section 4 provides, in relevant part:  “The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ112.txt unknown Seq: 16 17-JAN-08 8:57
286 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:271
the court to send a case to arbitration when it finds that it is subject to a valid
agreement to arbitrate.  This supports the parties’ decision to arbitrate the dis-
pute rather than having it heard by a trial court by affirmatively divesting the
court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the dispute.72  Section 5 further
reaffirms that choice by assuring that the parties’ chosen method of selecting
the arbitrator will be followed, but permitting the court to appoint an arbitra-
tor(s) if the parties cannot agree on a selection to prevent circumvention of the
initial agreement to arbitrate.73  Similarly, section 7 requires the court to back
up efforts by arbitrators to summon witnesses and documents through the avail-
ability of the judicial power to compel.74  Section 9 maintains the enforceabil-
ity of the arbitrator’s award by requiring the court to confirm the award if asked
within a year of the decision,75 while sections 1076 and 1177 guarantee the
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Id. § 4.
72 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 66-70 (4th ed. 2007).
73 Section 5 provides, in relevant part:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or
arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed;  but if no method be provided therein, or
if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or
in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall
designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall
act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically
named therein . . . .
9 U.S.C. § 5.
74 Section 7 provides, in relevant part:
[A]rbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may
summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper
case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed
material as evidence in the case. . . .  [I]f any person or persons so summoned to testify shall
refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States district court for the
district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance
. . . .
Id. § 7.
75 Section 9 provides, in relevant part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon
the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within
one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified
for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.  If no
court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.
Id. § 9.
76 Section 10(a) provides that an award can be vacated only when “procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means,” when there was “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,”
where the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” in the conduct of the hearing, or
“exceeded their powers” under the submission to arbitration. Id. § 10.
77 Section 11 permits a court to correct an arbitral award “[w]here there was an evident
material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any
person, thing, or property referred to in the award,” where the arbitrator issued an award
“upon a matter not submitted to them,” and where the award is “imperfect in matter of form
not affecting the merits of the controversy.” Id. § 11.
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finality of the arbitrator’s decision by limiting the grounds for review to proce-
dural error and permitting arbitrators to correct minor errors in the award with-
out having to re-open the decision.
D. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the FAA
Remarkably, the Federal Arbitration Act has not undergone a major revi-
sion, or seen a major amendment, since it was enacted in 1925.  It has, how-
ever, been heavily litigated.
Again, space does not permit a comprehensive recounting, but the U.S.
Supreme Court’s expansive view of the statute has been widely acknowledged
and frequently criticized.78  One of the chief veins of criticism has been that the
Court has abandoned the voluntariness in the agreement to arbitrate that the
statute assumed and instead has permitted the unilateral imposition of arbitra-
tion in contracts of adhesion.79  In so doing, it has expanded the scope of the
statute beyond its original business-to-business intent to include the arbitration
of statutory claims, such as job discrimination80 and consumer claims.81  It has
also given the statute nearly unprecedented preemptive power, holding that the
act evidences a strong federal policy favoring arbitration,82 applies in state
courts,83 preempts hostile state law,84 and applies to transactions as broadly as
the federal Commerce Clause permits.85  The Court has even held that arbitra-
tion clauses are valid in contracts that may otherwise be invalid because of
78 See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 8; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbi-
tration:  The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims:  Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOF-
STRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Cliff Palefsky, The Civil Rights Struggle Against Mandatory Arbi-
tration–From “Separate But Equal” to “Just Another Forum,” in ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 534 (2002); Reuben, supra note 62, at 303-07; David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 8.
79 See supra note 78; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim).
80 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
81 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (mobile home financing);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (termite extermination ser-
vices); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (claims by
securities investors); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (same).
82 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(Because FAA establishes strong policy favoring arbitration, “as a matter of federal law, any
doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967) (federal law of arbitration is substantive law
for Erie purposes).
83 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (FAA preempts any state law restrict-
ing arbitrability).
84 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (FAA preempts Montana statute
that conditioned enforceability of arbitration clause on compliance with special notice
requirements).
85 Dobson, 513 U.S. at 273-77 (giving term “commerce” in FAA its broadest possible
construction).
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fraud or other contract formation defenses,86 or because they violate public
policy.87
As a result of this extraordinary judicial support, the use of FAA arbitra-
tion has expanded dramatically in the last two decades.  While specific num-
bers are hard to come by, arbitration provisions have become common for
employment, consumer, financial services, health care, online retail service,
and other disputes.  The securities industry is an example of an entire economic
sphere that has become dominated by arbitration; virtually all investor-broker
and employment disputes are subject to arbitration because of provisions in
standard form employment and retainer agreements.  Arbitration provisions in
standard form agreements have become commonplace; indeed, one study found
that they were embedded in fully one-third of all standard-form agreements.88
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been controversial and often ideo-
logically driven, a contextual factor that is significant in the movement toward
substantive legal review.  To help resist the sirens of ideology, it is helpful to
view the case law in this area through the lens of legal process theory, which is
specifically aimed at avoiding such ideology.  This approach to law, prevalent
in the 1950s and 1960s, generally contended that the legitimacy of the law
should be measured by the process by which it was created rather than its sub-
stantive results.  While its influence has waned in the shadow of other jurispru-
dential movements, such as law and economics and behavioral psychology,
many of its main tenets still border on conventional wisdom.  For example, it
was legal process theorists such as Herbert Wechsler who argued that legal
decisions should be decided by neutral principles rather than by political con-
siderations or the personal preferences of the judges.89  Similarly, judicial
restraint rather than activism was an important value of the legal process
school. Alexander Bickel wrote of “the least dangerous branch,” envisioning a
court that rarely exercised its constitutional power, thus preserving its institu-
tional capital as a “passive virtue.”90  Rather than activism in imposing their
value preferences, the legal process theorists generally held that the proper role
of the court was to defer to the democratically elected political branches on
questions of policy, especially the legislature.
Judged by this standard, the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence is a legal
process nightmare, as by judicial fiat it has converted the relatively innocuous
FAA statute into a sweeping barrier to access to the courts and a bludgeon of
86 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04 (where contract contains arbitration clause, court may
consider only defenses relating to the arbitration provision; defenses addressed to the entire
contract decided by arbitrator).
87 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448-49 (2006) (upholding arbi-
tration provision in contract that would violate state usury laws).
88 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004).
89 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7-9 (1959).
90 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986); Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword:  The Passive Vir-
tues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 58-64 (1961).
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federal power.91  Rather than interpreting the FAA narrowly as a procedural
rule for federal courts, the court has inflated it into a substantive rule that
applies in federal and state courts,92 trumping any arguably hostile state law,93
and depriving states of the ability to regulate in an area traditionally reserved
for the states:  the law of contracts.94  In so doing, it has given non-lawyers the
power to decide the legal validity of contracts containing arbitration provisions
and, fantastically, has held that the arbitration clause in a contract is enforcea-
ble even if the contract itself is not.95  And it has held that hard-fought statutory
civil rights, such as race and gender discrimination, can be unilaterally com-
pelled into arbitration—extending the act far beyond its business-to-business
origins.
It is against this background that the proposals by Professors Stempel,
Cole, and Drahozal must be understood.
III. DISPLACING FINALITY WITH SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW:  THE PROPOSALS
BY PROFESSORS STEMPEL, COLE, AND DRAHOZAL
The proposals by Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal essentially
respond to the Court’s jurisprudence and the ensuing evolution of commercial
arbitration practice over the last thirty years—the era of what Professor Stem-
pel calls “mass production arbitration.”  While they clearly come from different
points on the continuum of political philosophy, they have in common a
broader, sometimes much broader, role for courts in the arbitration process.  In
varying degrees, each of them would diminish or eliminate the finality element
of arbitration and allow for substantive judicial review of arbitration awards—
either because it is necessary to protect consumers in an era of mandatory arbi-
tration, because the parties want it, or because the courts must do so to preserve
their own integrity and that of the civil justice system.  After briefly describing
each of these proposals, I will address some of the troubling issues they raise.
A. Professor Stempel:  A Classic Liberal Approach
Professor Stempel’s proposal is clearly the most far reaching of the three
proposals.  His approach is classically liberal, with a deep-seated concern for
91 For general discussion, see MACNEIL, supra note 8; Carrington & Haagen, supra note 8;
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006).
92 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (FAA preempts state laws restricting
arbitrability); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967)
(FAA is substantive law for Erie purposes).
93 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (FAA preempts Montana statute
that conditioned enforceability of arbitration clause on compliance with special notice
requirements).
94 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (federal rule on
seperability trumps state law of contract formation).
95 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46 (federal rule on separability trumps state law of contract
formation); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402 (articulating “separability” doctrine).
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the fairness of the “mass [produced]” arbitration process.96  He concedes not
the correctness, but the fact of mandatory arbitration, and exhorts scholars,
judges, and others interested in FAA arbitration to shift their focus toward
ensuring the quality and fairness of arbitration.97  For Stempel, this includes
issues of consumer protection, vindication of public policy, enforcement of the
law, fairness, neutrality, and competence.98
The quality issues he raises are not insignificant.  Stempel suggests that
“mass produced” arbitrations—basically consumer and employment arbitra-
tions pursuant to mandatory arbitration clauses—are conducted by less exper-
ienced single arbitrators rather than a trio of “grand old men” (and today,
women) of the profession.99  At a minimum, this can lead to incompetent or
inconsistent decisions, he says, if not outright bias because of the economic
incentive arbitrators have to rule in favor of repeat players who can provide
more business.100  Worse yet, Stempel says society cannot count on providers
and the marketplace to correct this problem because the incentives of providers
go the other way—toward favoring the businesses because providers want to be
drafted into their mandatory arbitration clauses.101
For Stempel, this problem is compounded by the potential for procedural
abuse.  The lack of discovery in arbitration already favors the company in
employment and consumer cases.  But Stempel notes that many institutional
players go farther still in drafting one-way arbitration provisions that, among
other things, limit remedies, impose costs and fees on the consumer or
employee, restrict the availability of counsel, shift fees to the prevailing party,
and restrict class treatment.102  Any fair system of arbitration would need to
curtail the potential for this kind of abuse, Stempel insists.
Stempel proposes a three-part solution to this problem.  First, license arbi-
tration service providers who broker “mass produced” arbitrations.103  Second,
amend the FAA to guarantee the scope of remedies available to parties in arbi-
tration.104  Finally, eliminate deferential substantive review for arbitral awards
in “manifest disregard of the law” and institute a system of judicial review that
parallels that of trial courts:  “clearly erroneous” for questions of fact, “abuse of
discretion” for the conduct of the proceeding, and “de novo” review for ques-
tions of pure law.105
B. Professor Cole:  A More Libertarian Approach
Where Stempel makes a classic liberal argument for greater judicial
review—to protect the rights of participants, especially low-power partici-
96 Stempel, supra note 4, at 251.  For a discussion of liberal political theory, generally
aimed at fostering equality among people, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 53-102 (2d ed. 2002).
97 Stempel, supra note 4, at 270.
98 Id. at 258-59.
99 Id. at 258.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 254-57.
103 Id. at 259.
104 Id. at 264.
105 Id. at 267.
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pants—Professor Cole takes a more libertarian approach.106  She argues that
parties should be permitted to contract for greater judicial review than the FAA
currently permits as a matter of “freedom of contract,”107 as long as the parties’
proposed alteration of the standard of review does not threaten the “institutional
integrity of the courts.”108
Professor Cole predicates her argument on the belief, shared by at least
one federal appeals court109 and some scholars,110 that certain provisions of the
FAA are default rules rather than mandatory rules.111  In particular, Cole says
the FAA’s key judicial review provision, section 10(a), should be viewed as a
default provision because such an interpretation better serves the “social policy
objectives” of the FAA since “default rules better preserve the concept of free-
dom of contract by allowing parties to opt out of them in favor of a regime they
prefer.”112  Under this view, parties would not need to comply with a default
rule if they agree to deal with the substantive issue it addresses in another way
by contract.
Professor Cole contends the courts should construe the current act as per-
mitting such a construction on what she calls a “standard textualist” interpreta-
tion of the statute.  The drafters, she notes, used the term “may” when they state
in section 10(a) that a court “may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party.”113  Cole says this discretionary language indicates
that the section as a whole is a permissive, or default, rule rather than a
mandatory rule.  She does, however, acknowledge that such an interpretation
may be based more on contemporary policies and practices rather than thin
legislative history of the FAA, which indicates that the drafters of section 10
were probably just codifying the law at the time:  that judicial review in arbitra-
tion should be limited to reversal on grounds of procedural irregularity—proba-
bly, she contends, rightly I think, because “the drafters simply did not
106 For a general discussion of libertarian political theory, which generally opposes govern-
mental interference with the market and private rights, see KYMLICKA, supra note 96, at 103-
66.
107 Cole, supra note 4, at 233.
108 Id. at 214.  Other commentators supporting this view include Margaret M. Maggio &
Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA:  The Enforceability of Private Agreements
to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J ON DISP. RESOL. 151
(2002); and Eric van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial
Review:  Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 157 (2003).  For examples
of critiques, see Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002).
For a general discussion of the issues, see Christopher Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA:
Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 419 (2003).
109 See, e.g., Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir.
1995).
110 See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration Sys-
tem:  Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 63, 79;
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
111 Cole, supra note 4, at 222-29.
112 Id. at 223.
113 Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
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contemplate that parties would ever be interested in expanding judicial review
of arbitration awards.”114
C. Professor Drahozal:  An Institutionalist Approach
Professor Drahozal takes a narrower view than either Professors Stempel
or Cole, seeking only to codify the non-statutory ground of “manifest disre-
gard,” and thus permit the vacatur of arbitration awards that are in manifest
disregard of the existing law for institutional reasons.  He defines manifest dis-
regard as the “intentional disregard of a well-established mandatory (not
default) rule.”115
For Drahozal, adding manifest disregard to the short list of statutory
grounds for vacatur under section 10(a) is necessary to “ensure the integrity of
the judicial process,”116 not to ensure compliance with mandatory legal rules.
Professor Drahozal fears that without manifest disregard review, courts would
be in the position of having to confirm awards that on their face “openly
refuse[ ] to follow established law.”117  This would undermine the legitimacy
of the judicial system and “could result in a political backlash against the arbi-
tration process,” he contends.118
Professor Drahozal acknowledges the possibility of abuse of the manifest
disregard standard, and further proposes safeguards to reduce the likelihood of
excessive challenges to arbitration awards.  One would require the loser of a
manifest disregard appeal to pay the winner’s attorneys fees or some other
sanction.119  The other would exempt non-American parties from the rule to not
discourage non-American parties from arbitrating in the United States.120  A
third would be an evidentiary constraint, precluding the courts from consider-
ing the arbitral record as a whole.121
IV. ON SECOND THOUGHT, LET’S NOT:  SOME PROBLEMS
WITH THESE PROPOSALS
These proposals to eliminate finality in favor of substantive judicial
review have profound implications for the future of arbitration.  Space prohibits
a detailed analysis of each component of all three proposals, worthy as that
would be.  Here in Part III, however, I will address each of these proposals by
reference to a few key issues that their arguments and proposals respectively
raise:  the distortion of arbitration process and characteristics that would result
from the enhanced judicial review that Professors Stempel and Cole seek, the
feasibilty problems in Professor Drahozal’s proposal to codify the “manifest
disregard” standard, and finally the ghost of mandatory arbitration that haunts
all three proposals.
114 Id. at 226-27.
115 Drahozal, supra note 4, at 247.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 248.
120 Id. at 249.
121 Id. at 248 n.104.
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A. Distorting the Process Characteristics and Values of Commercial
Arbitration
Finality is one of the core process characteristics and values of arbitration
under the FAA, and displacing it with substantive judicial review—whether on
Stempel’s comprehensive basis or Cole’s contracted basis—would have distor-
tive consequences that would reverberate throughout the rest of commercial
arbitration’s process characteristics and values.
1. Efficiency
As experience in the public adjudication system itself makes clear, if you
give a losing litigant in adjudication an opportunity to appeal, the litigant will
often take advantage of it.122  If required by Congress, as Professor Stempel
suggests, appeals of arbitration awards would become routine, and arbitration
would become just another step in the costly litigation process.  If actually
encouraged by congressional authorization to include substantive review provi-
sions, as Professor Cole suggests, many parties—particularly sophisticated
users with bargaining power—can reasonably be expected to include judicial
review provisions just to preserve the option of appealing an adverse decision;
indeed, this may be the real motive behind party interest in contracted judicial
review to begin with.123  Either proposal would emasculate the efficiency of
arbitration for both the parties and the courts.
From the perspective of the parties, the exhaustion of appeals can take
months, even years, to complete, during which time the disposition of the legal
matter at issue is essentially in limbo.  Costs, too, can be expected to increase
significantly because a reviewing court will need a transcribed copy of the arbi-
tration proceedings, and attorneys will need to be retained to research, write,
file, and argue the appeals.
122 Empirical researchers looking at federal courts, for example, have found a significant
level of appeals, although there is significant variation in the assessment of the federal rate
depending upon the data set and other research parameters.  Cornell Law School empiricist
Theodore Eisenberg found a federal appeal rate of 10.9% for all federal civil cases filed
between 1987 and 1996.  Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and
Nontried Cases:  Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 659, 663, 664 tbl.1 (2004).  Other researchers have found lower rates. See,
e.g., Carol Krafka et al., Stalking the Increase in the Rate of Federal Civil Appeals, 18 JUST.
SYS. J. 233, 244 (1996) (“[T]he relationship between appeals and district court terminations
held steady through the years, with approximately 8.6 appeals filed for every 100 district
terminations.”).  Others have said it is higher, approximately 13%, see Jay Tidmarsh,
Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 555 (2006), while others place it
in the 10.3% to 18.6% range, when high-appeal cases, such as prisoner and federal civil
rights appeals, are factored into the analysis. See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1609 n.38 (2000).  One can reasonably expect results that are not
too dissimilar for state courts.
123 It is unclear just how many parties in fact seek to contract for judicial review.  Cole
indicates that there is significant and growing interest, and that may be true when comparing
the current year to a decade ago.  However, I am skeptical that the number of arbitration
agreements containing judicial review clauses is significant when compared with all arbitra-
tions in the current year, given that finality is one of the reasons why parties might seek to
choose arbitration to resolve the dispute.  At bottom, this is an empirical question, and one
well worth pursuing.
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From the perspective of the courts, it is hard to imagine a move more
detrimental to judicial efficiency.  The introduction of substantive judicial
review of arbitration awards opens the courthouse doors to an entire class of
cases not currently eligible for consideration by the federal courts, and a rela-
tively large one at that.  What’s more, those doors are not opened once but
twice, at the trial level and then at the appellate levels.  While records are not
kept on the number of arbitrations conducted every year, and providers jeal-
ously guard such information as proprietary, it seems reasonable to assume the
total number of cases arbitrated annually in the United States is at least in the
hundreds of thousands,124 if only because of the proliferation of mandatory
arbitration provisions in standard form contracts.125  This will put considerably
more pressure on the dockets of the current federal bench and perhaps even
require its expansion to accommodate the additional workload.
2. Standard for Decision
The displacement of finality with substantive judicial review can also be
expected to legalize arbitral decision making.126  Arbitrators who do not base
their decisions on legal standards today have the capacity and comfort of doing
so precisely because there is no appellate body to “second-guess” their deci-
sions.  In an environment of substantive judicial review, however, it is reasona-
ble to expect this to change quite dramatically.  Arbitrators can be expected to
rely less on equity, justice, industry standards, or other norms that could be
interpreted by a reviewing court as erroneous under Professor Stempel’s com-
prehensive review standard, or arbitrary and capricious under Professor Cole’s
standard.  Few neutrals like to be reversed, a dynamic that is only exacerbated
by the fact that arbitration is a system that is largely regulated by the free
market, where reversal and affirmation rates can easily be exploited in the com-
petition for market share.  While only time will tell, one can reasonably expect
arbitral decision making to become less adaptive and more closely tethered to
pre-existing substantive and procedural norms—i.e., the law.
The institutionalization of this type of formalization would be devastating
to arbitration as we know it.  Along with finality, the flexibility of decision
making and the ability of the arbitrators to ground their rulings in norms other
than law go to the heart of arbitration as a dispute resolution process and its
distinction from public adjudication.  It is this flexibility that allows arbitrators
to season their judgment with their experience, their knowledge of the field,
124 The most recent publication of the AAA’s caseload figures appeared in the AAA’s Dis-
pute Resolution Journal in 2002. AAA 2001 Case Filings Break Record, DISP. RESOL. J.,
May-July 2002, at 4 (“Since 1995, the American Arbitration Association’s total caseload has
shown consistent annual growth.  The number of cases filed in 2001—a total of 218,032—
continued the pace, breaking the previous year’s record of 198,491 by 19,541—an increase
of just about 10%.”). Business Week reported in 1996 that the American Arbitration Associ-
ation alone then annually managed a caseload of one-fourth the size of all federal court civil
case filings.  Eric Schine & Linda Himelstein, The Explosion in Private Justice:  Demand for
Civil Arbitration Fuels the Rise of an Industry, BUS. WK., June 12, 1995, at 88, 88-89.
125 Demaine & Hensler, supra note 88.
126 For concerns about a similar phenomenon in mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:  A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or ‘The Law
of ADR,’ 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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and practical wisdom.  Without it, you simply do not have the kind of commer-
cial arbitration that Congress so strongly endorsed in the Federal Arbitration
Act.
3. Form of Decision
Substantive judicial review will also necessarily change the form of deci-
sion.  Courts will need to have written and reasoned decisions to review, and
arbitrators will be obliged to provide them.  This will come at a financial cost to
the parties, who likely will have to pay for the arbitrator’s time drafting the
opinion.  One may reasonably expect that it will also result in delay in at least
some cases, perhaps many, as arbitrators labor longer and more defensively to
produce written and reasoned awards that will withstand the scrutiny of a
reviewing court.
4. Decision Makers
Changes in the standards and form of arbitral decisions may lead risk-
averse parties to be more reluctant to select non-lawyers as arbitrators.  As a
group, lawyer arbitrators will likely be more familiar than non-lawyer arbitra-
tors with the kinds of problems in written decisions that may trigger reversal on
review by a court of law, even when the arbitrators are not strictly applying the
law or when the law is ambiguous.  While this would provide more certainty in
an era of substantive judicial review, it would also crimp the ability of parties
to choose arbitrators based on their specialized knowledge of industry customs
or practices, or other non-legal standards, as a basis for resolving their dispute.
5. Formality and Civility
Raising the level of judicial review can also be expected to raise the level
of formality of arbitration hearings.  Legal counsel of course must represent
their arbitration clients as diligently and zealously as their clients in public
adjudication.  In an environment of substantive judicial review, one can reason-
ably anticipate counsel being compelled to prepare the case for review during
the arbitration proceeding itself just as they do during a trial proceeding.  This
means not only raising more objections but also introducing more defensive
evidence aimed at bolstering one’s own prospects upon appeal or blunting the
force of the other party’s appeal.  Such a shift in the nature of the process could
also affect the civility of the proceedings, causing them to be more adversarial.
6. Privacy
Finally, the privacy of arbitration would be severely compromised by a
regime of substantive review of arbitration awards.  As noted above, judicial
review would require a record that a court can review, and a federal district
court would generally be required to issue a written and reasoned opinion in its
review of the award.  That opinion would necessarily include information that
the parties might have chosen arbitration to avoid making public, such as the
identities of the parties, the facts of the dispute, the amount in controversy, and
the arguments made by the parties.  If the opinion was designated for publica-
tion, it could be reported by newspapers, broadcast over the airways, and made
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available on commercial reporting services, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis.
Moreover, any documents received by the trial court would be freely available
as public records.  While it is true that one or both of the parties could seek an
order sealing the proceedings, the movant bears a high burden of proof and may
not succeed.127
B. Some Additional Problems in Contracted Substantive Review
The forgoing discussion applies generally to the elimination of finality
through substantive judicial review of arbitration awards under the FAA, and as
such would be implicated by Professor Stempel’s proposal for comprehensive
substantive review, Professor Cole’s proposal for substantive review upon party
request, and to a lesser extent Professor Drahozal’s proposal to codify the man-
ifest disregard standard.  Professor Cole’s proposal for opt-in substantive
review raises a few additional complications.
1. The Meaning of “Freedom of Contract”
Much of Cole’s discussion is dedicated to why courts should find that
contracted judicial review is permitted under the FAA as presently drafted.
The federal courts of appeal have split on this question.  Courts that have
endorsed contracted judicial review have used a variety of theories, including
contract and the interpretation of section 10 as a default rule.128  Courts have
also rejected the proposition on a variety of grounds, either because it would
frustrate the purposes of the FAA or because the parties do not have the power
to establish federal court jurisdiction by contract.129
Congress of course can solve this problem by simply amending the FAA
to permit contracted substantive review.  This in turn raises the deeper policy
question of whether Congress should take such a step.  The primary policy
argument Cole makes in favor of such an amendment is the promotion of the
parties’ “freedom of contract.”  In a democracy predicated in part on the impor-
127 Protective orders are authorized by FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).  Because of the presumption
favoring public access to judicial proceedings, moving parties bear the burden of proof,
which often requires a showing of good cause and specific harms that will be incurred by
one or more of the parties if the information is disclosed. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a long-standing tradition of allowing
the public “to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents”); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002) (parties
secrecy agreement does not warrant maintaining documents under seal); United States v.
Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995) (establishing a presumption of access).
128 See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001) (endorsing
substantive review if the statute clearly provides for it); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No.
96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *7 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (accepting substantive review for
“errors of law or legal reasoning”); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d
993 (5th Cir. 1995) (permitting substantive review because section 10 of FAA is a default
provision).
129 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (reversing circuit panel decision endorsing contracted substantive review
because it defeats purpose of arbitration); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935
(10th Cir. 2001) (contracted judicial review frustrates purpose of FAA); Chi. Typographical
Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (federal jurisdic-
tion cannot be created by contract).  For state decisions, see Cole, supra note 4, at 220 n.29.
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tance of personal autonomy,130 this argument has powerful resonance.  On the
other hand, unless the law is moving back to some form of Lochnerism,131 the
freedom of contract is not without constraint, no more so than any other consti-
tutional right.  Virtually all of law operates to constrain the freedom of some-
one or something; this is the price of an organized society operating under the
rule of law.132  The real question is the legitimacy of the constraint.
a. Process Structure as a Constraint on the “Freedom of
Contract”
A process characteristics and values approach to defining dispute resolu-
tion processes would suggest that integrity of process structure is a reasonable
constraint upon party freedom in a dispute resolution process.  Process labels
may seem formalistic, but such labels do have significant impact on the expec-
tations and legal rights of the parties.  Through the FAA, the government con-
fers significant benefits on parties to an agreement to arbitrate, including
judicial enforcement of the initial agreement to arbitrate, judicial support for
the arbitration process in terms of compelling witnesses and documents, and the
judicial enforcement of the arbitral award.  Given the tension between process
purity and innovation discussed above, it is incumbent upon the Congress to be
specific about the process that will receive such benefits.
It is further reasonable for Congress to limit these benefits to the tradi-
tional model of commercial arbitration and the important role that it ascribes to
finality.  As previously described at length, finality is a cornerstone of the arbi-
tration process, making possible many of the other process characteristics and
values, including efficiency, flexibility in decision making, and informality.
Maintaining finality would be consistent with the Anglo-American history of
commercial arbitration and its historic practice both domestically and interna-
tionally,133 and therefore accords with the expectations of the public with
130 See Reuben, supra note 62, at 285-87.
131 The Lochner era refers to the period in the early part of the twentieth century when the
U.S. Supreme Court embraced private contractual rights over the ability of government to
enact laws that protect the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of citizens through its
police powers. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The Lochner era ended, and
became discredited, when the Court set a new course for its Fourteenth Amendment due
process jurisprudence that focused on the political process and the protection of “discrete
and insular minorities.” See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a general discussion
of the Lochner era, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES 614-25 (3d ed. 2006).
132 See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW:  PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOV-
ERNING POWER 385-500 (1952) (contending that by its very nature, legal regulation benefits
one by constraining the freedom of another).  For a discussion, see Reuben, supra note 62, at
303-07.
133 There has been recent debate about incorporating substantive review in the international
commercial arbitration context, although there certainly is no consensus as to its propriety.
Compare David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in
Investor-State Disputes:  Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39 (2006),
with Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards:  Is the Desire for Accuracy
Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 444 (2006).  The International
Centre for the Settlement of International Disputes toyed with the idea but ultimately with-
drew its proposal for appellate review. See id. at 444.  There may be greater justification for
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regard to commercial arbitration and the path dependence of the law over a
period of centuries.134  From a process characteristics and values perspective,
displacing finality with substantive review would have a severely detrimental
effect on the other process characteristics and values of commercial arbitration.
This is not to suggest that parties who want substantive review in private
adjudication are without options.  One possibility, of course, is to stay in the
traditional system of public adjudication, which provides both substantive
review and established legal rules upon which to base such review.  However,
they also have the option of private appellate review panels, and the rules of
some private arbitration providers accommodate this interest by permitting
internal appeals.135  While such second bites of the arbitration apple do frus-
trate efficiency goals in individual cases, and perhaps raise questions about the
depth of the parties’ commitment to arbitral finality, it is certainly plausible that
parties in individual cases may value efficiency less than other process vir-
tues.136  In my view, principles of personal autonomy would suggest that they
have this option, and I agree—so long as such appeal is through a private pro-
cess rather than in the public courts.  If a party chooses to opt out of the public
court system for purposes of the substantive decision, that party should not be
permitted to opt back in to the public court system for purposes of substantive
review.  One cannot have it both ways.
When a case is within the public adjudication system, evidence upon
which a decision may be made is subjected to rigorous testing for relevance,
veracity, accuracy, integrity, and other concerns that arise from the search for
truth. It is in part for this reason that trial court rulings on questions of fact are
typically given great deference by appellate courts and that society can have
confidence in public appellate court decisions.  Decisions of commercial arbi-
trators, however, can be based on evidence that has not survived such scrutiny.
It makes sense for public policy to support a “lawless” private alternative pro-
cess as long as the results do not need to be reviewed for accuracy by public
courts.  However, it would undermine the integrity of the public courts to allow
appellate review to proceed on the basis of evidence that has been tainted at the
lower level by an evidentiary process that permitted the consideration of unreli-
able evidence.  The legitimacy of appellate outcomes is at least in part predi-
cated on the legitimacy of the record before it.  It would also shift to the public
substantive review in the international context because unlike the domestic U.S. context,
there is for the most part no other forum where parties can go if they want formal legal
standards applied accurately other than the domestic courts of the country of one of the
parties.
134 For a classic work on path dependence, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTI-
TUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); for an application, see D. Daniel
Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders:  The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust
in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37 (2007).  To the extent that Professor
Stempel’s argument rests on the path dependence created by the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbi-
tration jurisprudence, I would suggest that such a departure constitutes path deviation from
centuries-long norms, not path dependence. See Stempel, supra note 4, at 257.
135 See, e.g., International Institute for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution,
Arbitration Appeal Procedure (2002); National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure R.
1(D) (2006).
136 See Chi. Typographical Union v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir.
1991).
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significant transactional costs associated with appeals, such as courtrooms,
judges, court reporters, clerks, and other support staff, and there is no reason
why such costs should be born to provide for review of decision by a private
neutral, especially when the award is tainted as described above.
By contrast, such private appellate processes likely would not affect the
public law process in the same way as a statutory authorization for substantive
judicial review in all or some cases arising under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Such private review does not implicate society’s efficiency interests in the
courts and the proper allocation of judicial resources because courts (and the
public) are not required to bear the burden of this party choice.  The parties
alone pay those costs.  Nor does the availability of such appellate review in the
rules of private arbitration providers broadly encourage losing parties to seek
substantive review in the same way as a legislative pronouncement from Con-
gress that such review is now available.  Finally, unlike public courts, private
substantive review would not compromise the flexibility of standards in arbitral
decision making unless the arbitrator was required by the parties to apply the
law accurately.  Rather than being appeals in the public law sense, such private
arbitral appeals are more in the nature of a second round of arbitration—rough
review of rough justice—and if they so agree, parties should be permitted to
arbitrate their dispute as many times as they would like.
b. Pragmatism as a Constraint on Party Freedom
It is unclear precisely what the freedom of contract argument contends in
this context, or what its limiting principles might be.  One can, for example,
view the argument broadly, as endorsing party contracting power over all
aspects of arbitration.  Or one can view it more narrowly, as endorsing party
contracting power over those areas of arbitration not precluded by the statute or
process structure as I have described.  Both are freedom-of-contract arguments
but lead to very different results on an issue like contracted substantive review.
The latter view—that freedom of contract means endorsing party con-
tracting power over those areas of arbitration not precluded by the statute or
process structure—raises few questions.  It is consistent with the language,
structure, and purpose of the FAA, and with the historical, jurisprudential, and
practical foundations upon which it was erected, and upon which subsequent
case law has developed.137  Moreover, it provides the parties considerable free-
dom in establishing the parameters of the arbitration process they will use:  to
choose the process to begin with, how many decision makers there will be, who
those decision makers will be, the issues they may decide, the standards that
may be used to make the decision, the evidence that will be considered, and the
procedural rules under which it is to be considered, among many other process
choices.  At the same time, this view provides a reasonable constraint on that
freedom, limiting the parties only to staying within the historical definitional
confines of the arbitration process, as embodied in the statute.
By contrast, the former view—that the freedom of contract in this context
means allowing parties contracting power over all aspects of arbitration—
137 See William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, ARB. J.,
Sept. 1993, at 27.
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would upset centuries of Anglo-American case law, both before and after the
adoption of the FAA,138 and raise a number of challenging pragmatic questions
that would have to be addressed by Congress, or, more likely, the courts.139
As a procedural matter, for example, it is likely that the parties, in the
name of contractual freedom, can agree to have only certain courts decide their
dispute.140  But would the freedom of contract go further and permit the parties
to draft an enforceable arbitration provision calling for review by specific
judges, such as Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook or U.S. District Judge
Jack Weinstein?  Would it permit the parties to require the reviewing court to
use or reject specific substantive rules, even ones that have not yet been
adopted by courts?
To her credit, Professor Cole at least offers one limiting principle in her
proposal for contracted substantive review:  Courts should not enforce such
provisions if they “threaten the institutional integrity of the court.”141  Yet it is
unclear from her discussion precisely what this “institutional integrity” proviso
means and how it would apply.  The term is not defined, nor are its contours
delineated with any precision other than by the tender of examples of proposed
party standards that courts could “easily reject,” such as “flipping a coin or
studying the entrails of a dead fowl,”142 or that make the court “appear to be an
unprincipled decision maker.”143
To be sure, one could argue that the selection of a specific judge to per-
form the substantive review is not such a hard case after all because the courts
138 For discussion and cases illustrating the historical significance of finality in commercial
arbitration, see JOHN T. MORSE JR., THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARD 383-406 (1872),
and WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 548-
74 (1930).
139 Pragmatism generally refers to the school of philosophy that holds that the truth of a
proposition is measured by its correspondence with practical outcomes, especially ones that
can be empirically tested.  This school was pioneered by C.S. Peirce and popularized by
William James. See A.J. AYER, THE ORIGINS OF PRAGMATISM (1968); WILLIAM JAMES,
PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (R.B. Perry ed., 1965).  Federal Circuit Judge Richard
Posner reinvigorated legal thinking about pragmatism in his book, RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 354 (2003). For a critique, see David Cole, The Pov-
erty of Posner’s Pragmatism:  Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1735
(2007) (book review).
140 See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that “rea-
sonable” forum selection clauses, while not historically favored, are prima facie valid when
freely negotiated by commercial parties in an international context). Bremen was later fol-
lowed by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (extending Bremen to
consumer cases in upholding a forum selection clause in a standard form cruise line ticket
requiring all claims to be decided in Florida).  This line of cases is extremely controversial,
as evidenced in the Supreme Court’s Carnival Cruise Lines decision, when Justice John Paul
Stevens affixed a copy of the contested standard form contract containing the fine print
forum selection clause to his dissenting opinion. See id. at 597-605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Cole, supra note 4, at 230.  For a critique of “institutional integrity” review, see Alan
Scott Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review:  A Brief Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB. 159, 173-
74 (2002) (“[R]esort to prophylactic rules in the interests of administrative convenience
always strikes me as a confession of failure—and as infinitely less satisfying than the adop-
tion of standards calling for ‘narrow and focused inquiry into the actual presence of some
feared evil.’”).
142 Cole, supra note 4, at 231.
143 Id.
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have an institutional interest in preserving their efficient operation that may not
be invaded by party contract.  But does that instrumental efficiency interest
reflect the “institutional integrity” of the court?  Surely no one would suggest
that Judges Easterbrook or Weinstein are incompetent to engage in such review
or would do so with any kind of bias or arbitrariness that would threaten the
institutional integrity of the court as Professor Cole has described.
Beyond such procedural questions, the substantive issues are treacherous.
Studying the entrails of a dead fowl may be an easy standard for a court to
reject, but how would harder cases be treated under “institutional integrity”
review?  Would it violate the institutional integrity of the courts to enforce a
review provision that precludes the court from applying a particular rule of law
if that is what the parties wanted and so agreed?  Or suppose the parties wanted
to establish a substantive rule for a reviewing court to apply that was unique in
that it had not been adopted by any federal court or perhaps by the relevant
circuit?  Conversely, what if the position had already been affirmatively
rejected by the particular circuit?  Suppose the rule was completely new, unlike
anything yet crafted by a legislature or court?144  Would enforcing such provi-
sions undermine the “institutional integrity of the court”?
The entrails of Judge Kozinski’s dead fowl may help establish an outer
boundary as the type of substantive review that would be well beyond the ken
of the public courts.  But as these pragmatic questions suggest, there is a vast
area of uncertainty between decision by entrail and decision according to the
strict rule of law.  It also demonstrates that even the well-advised constraint
suggested by Professor Cole suffers from questions of scope and ambiguity that
would require many new lines of cases to resolve fully.  Given the wealth of
opportunity that otherwise remains for party autonomy in commercial arbitra-
tion as historically constructed, such a radical shift in arbitration law hardly
seems justified.  Again, to the extent the parties have felt a need for some kind
of substantive review, private appellate panels provide such an opportunity.
2. The Mandatory Arbitration Problem
Much of Cole’s discussion about contracted substantive review seems to
be based on a voluntary model of arbitration.  However, as we have seen above,
many cases come to arbitration from clauses that have been unilaterally
imposed in a standard form contract of adhesion.  Reasonable minds of course
may disagree on whether the agreement to arbitrate in such a situation is con-
sensual.  However, there can be little disagreement about the potential for abuse
inherent in such situations.145  The cases are replete with one-sided arbitration
144 For discussion of a creative ADR structure that began with an arbitration but led to a
negotiation that resulted in a contractual agreement by the parties to establish a private sys-
tem of law, see Robert H. Mnookin & Jonathan D. Greenberg, Lessons of the IBM-Fujitsu
Arbitration:  How Disputants Can Work Together to Solve Deeper Conflicts, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 1998, at 16.
145 For a similar critique, see Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration
Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 189-200 (2003); see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter
Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice:  Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review
of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 861, 912 (2004) (Empirical analysis of 151
cases in which arbitration awards were appealed demonstrates that expanded review clauses
“open broad avenues for employers to escape the arbitrations that they institute.”).
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provisions, such as those limiting remedies, imposing costs and fees on the
consumer or employee, and restricting the availability of counsel, among
others.146  Expanded review provides yet another avenue in which such abuses
can be imposed and in which power imbalances between the parties can be
exploited.
C. The Elasticity of the Manifest Disregard Standard
While Professors Stempel and Cole propose fairly sweeping changes to
the FAA, Professor Drahozal’s proposal to codify the common law “manifest
disregard” standard147 for the vacatur of an arbitral award is intended to be
more modest.  The idea here is to provide the courts with clear statutory author-
ity to throw out the bizarre arbitration award, in order to preserve the integrity
of the court system.
1. Background of the Doctrine
As Professor Drahozal notes, the manifest disregard standard is a non-
statutory ground148 that emanates from dicta in the Wilko v. Swan case, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court said:  “In unrestricted submissions . . . the inter-
pretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”149
Wilko was overruled,150 thus paving the way for mandatory arbitration.  But
this particular dictum seems to live on, in part because it was cited with appar-
146 For examples of particularly one-sided mandatory arbitration clauses, see, e.g., Hooters
of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting as unconscionable an
arbitration provision that limited remedies and depositions, and bound only the employee,
among other abuses); and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d
669 (Cal. 2000) (arbitration provision requiring only employee to arbitrate, and even then
not affording full statutory remedies, was substantively unconscionable).
147 One state, Georgia, has codified the “manifest disregard” standard. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
9-13(b)(5) (2007).  For a critical commentary, see David Boohaker, Note, The Addition of
the “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Defense to Georgia’s Arbitration Code and Potential
Conflicts with Federal Law, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 501 (2004).
148 Drahozal, supra note 4, at 249.  The authors of a prominent arbitration treatise have tied
manifest disregard to section 10(a)(4)’s proscription of awards that exceed the scope of the
submission, on the theory that the parties do not have the capacity to empower an arbitrator
to issue an award that is in manifest disregard of the law.  4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FED-
ERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.5.1.3 (1994).  For cases supporting this proposition, see
George Chamberlin, CAUSE OF ACTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD ON GROUND OF
EXCESS OF POWERS BY ARBITRATOR, 27 CAUSES OF ACTION 113, § 9 (2006).  I would reject
this interpretation in that it is based on the assumption that arbitrators cannot issue a “law-
less” decision, a belief that fails to recognize that arbitration awards can be based on non-
legal standards. See, e.g., Baize v. Eastridge Cos., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 768-69 (Ct. App.
2006); Marsch v. Williams, 23 Cal. App. 4th 238, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1994) (review denied
June 1, 1994); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 4th 576, 587 (Ct. App.
1993) (“The claim is not persuasive.  It confuses the mode of decision with its finality.”); D
& E Constr. Co. v. Denley, No. 02A01-9812-CH-00358, 1999 WL 685883, at *5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 3, 1999).
149 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
150 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989).
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ent approval in a later Supreme Court case, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan.151
In an important sense, manifest disregard can be seen as a remnant of the
old ouster doctrine, when courts believed that the law of the land was para-
mount to any other type of dispute resolution.152  While the ouster doctrine was
swept away legislatively with the FAA and related state laws, and later judi-
cially by the Supreme Court, suspicion of arbitration has lingered in the minds
of many courts, fueled in part by the rise of mandatory arbitration.153  The
prospect of judicial review for manifest disregard has given the courts comfort
in moving forward with mandatory arbitration.  As the Supreme Court said
reassuringly in Gilmer, “‘although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards nec-
essarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the requirements of the statute’ at issue.”154  Even apart from the
mandatory context, the continued validity of the “manifest disregard” doctrine
at common law preserves at least the judicial threat that an arbitration award
can be invalidated because of the sovereignty of the law, hanging over the
heads of arbitrators “like a sword of Damocles.”155
There are different formulations in the cases, but most courts have con-
cluded that parties seeking vacatur on this ground must show the award was
inconsistent with clear controlling law, the arbitrator knew what the controlling
law was, and intentionally chose to ignore or disregard it.156  Yet there is some
tension in the cases, as it is also frequently said that a mere error of law or
failure to apply the law does not rise to the level of manifest disregard of the
law;157 rather manifest disregard is something more akin to brazen defiance.
While nearly all courts claim the power to set aside an arbitral award on
the ground of manifest disregard under these circumstances,158 few in fact
151 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (noting that parties can
seek vacatur in a narrow set of instances, including Wilko v. Swan “(parties bound by arbitra-
tor’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)”).
152 See Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:  Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443, 471-73 (1998).  For a critique of the manifest disregard doctrine as
unnecessary in light of the implied obligation of arbitrators to apply the law in good faith,
see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547
(2005).
153 See infra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
154 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (quoting Shearson/
Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)); see also Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing manifest disregard as a vehicle
for enforcing party rights under Gilmer).
155 William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitration Awards, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 2007, at 309, 342 (PLI Litg. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
10796, 2007), WL 756 PLI/Lit 309.
156 For a general discussion, see Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the ‘Manifest Disregard’ of
the Law Standard:  The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117, 124-25.
157 See, e.g., San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293
F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally Hayford, supra note 152, at 465-76.
158 See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004) (citing cases).
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do.159  One study of vacatur of 336 federal and state employment arbitration
awards between 1975 and 2006 found that manifest disregard was the most
common ground for seeking relief (30.4% of all appellate cases studied) but
was only successful in 8.2% of the cases.160  Another study, of all state and
federal cases in which a party sought vacatur between January 1, 2004, and
October 31, 2004, 182 cases reached similar results:  Manifest disregard was
the second most frequently raised reason cited for vacatur (28.6%) but suc-
ceeded in only 3.8% of the cases (two cases).161
2. Professor Drahozal’s Proposal
In his proposal, Professor Drahozal defines manifest disregard as the
“intentional disregard of a well-established mandatory (not default) rule.”162
For Drahozal, an award is in disregard of the law (a mandatory rule) when an
arbitrator is aware of the rule and disregards it, as with the common law.  It is
in “manifest disregard” of the law for Drahozal when the rule being disregarded
is apparent, or “manifest,” on the face of the award itself.163
a. The Conceptual Problem with Manifest Disregard Review
From a process characteristics and values perspective, manifest disregard
makes little sense.  One of the core defining characteristics of arbitration is that
it allows for decisions to be made according to standards other than law, such
as industry practices or professional norms, or even common sense.  It mixes
apples and oranges to have a process with this flexibility in decisional standard,
only to have it judged by legal standards upon review.  Yet under the manifest
disregard standard, this is precisely what can happen.  Arbitrators could make
decisions on the basis of workplace practices, for example, but would be sub-
ject to reversal if those workplace practices were inconsistent with “clear” law.
In my view, manifest disregard substantially undermines the utility and desira-
bility of the arbitration process under the FAA, its distinction from the process
of public adjudication, and the autonomy of the parties to choose to have their
dispute resolved by a third party on a basis other than law.  One suspects this is
one reason that some courts have rejected the manifest disregard standard164
and others have applied it so sparingly.
159 For the highly unusual situation in which a federal appeals court was willing to vacate an
award based on a finding of manifest disregard, see Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers,
Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997) (arbitral panel told the relevant legal standards during
the arbitration and was repeatedly exhorted to ignore it by the prevailing counsel, and the
facts did not support the finding). See also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202
(2d Cir. 1997) (permitting further proceedings on whether an award is in fact in manifest
disregard of the law).
160 See MICHAEL H. LEROY & PETER FEUILLE, HAPPILY NEVER AFTER:  WHEN FINAL AND
BINDING ARBITRATION HAS NO FAIRY TALE ENDING 25 (2007), available at http://works.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=michael_leroy.
161 Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2005, at 23, 25 (2005).
162 Drahozal, supra note 4, at 247.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1992).
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b. The Practicality of Drahozal’s Proposal
While the foregoing is a general critique of the doctrine of manifest disre-
gard, the Drahozal proposal in particular raises significant practical questions.
1. How Clear Is “Clear”?
Drahozal’s proposal calls for vacatur when an arbitration award disregards
“clear” law.  This raises the threshold question of whether the law claimed to
have been disregarded was sufficiently “clear” to justify the vacatur of an arbi-
tration award.  Rarely do we see legal rules incapable of alternative interpreta-
tion, either in terms of their substantive meaning or their practical application.
Indeed, defining what constitutes “clear” law has bedeviled administrative law
cases for more than twenty years, in a situation that is analogous to Drahozal’s
proposal.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine calls for courts to defer
to agency judgments on questions of law by an agency charged with the admin-
istration of a statute if the law is “clear” and the agency’s interpretation of it is
“reasonable.”165  The courts have struggled mightily in their attempt to inter-
pret the meaning of “clear” law.166  As one scholar has observed, Chevron “has
generated an enormous range of problems—and, of course, an enormous body
of case law and academic commentary.”167
Drahozal’s proposal holds similar peril, and further complicates this prob-
lem by requiring arbitrators and courts to distinguish between mandatory and
default rules, which Drahozal has acknowledged in other work is problematic
in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act.168  The courts can sort this out,
but the courts are supposed to be among the beneficiaries of arbitration’s effi-
ciency process characteristic and value.  The FAA contemplates a minimal role
for the court, not an expanding one, and it would take many years and many
cases for the courts to define “clear” for purposes of Drahozal’s manifest disre-
gard standard.
2. Odd Results and Perverse Incentives
The proposal also leads to odd results and perverse incentives, as illus-
trated by a series of simple hypotheticals.
1. Suppose, for example, an arbitration between a homeowner and a con-
tractor over remodeling and repairs, and that the arbitration submission was
silent on the application of legal standards.  Assume further that the arbitrator
based her decision on norms within the construction industry that lead to a
165 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-46 (1984).
166 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 607 (2d ed. 2001) (determining whether
a statute is clear “is perhaps the most important question in the implementation of Chevron,
and as yet no case has even attempted . . . to provide an answer”). But see Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990) (using traditional tools of statutory interpretation
such as language, purpose, and structure to assess clarity of statute being administered by an
agency).
167 LAWSON, supra note 166, at 585.  For a discussion of recent cases, see The U.S. Supreme
Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 395 (2007).  For a fuller recent
treatment, see Note, How Clear is “Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1687 (2005).
168 Drahozal, supra note 108, at 429-30.
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result different than the result would have been at law.  Would such an award
be subject to reversal under Professor Drahozal’s proposal for manifest disre-
gard review?
Probably not.  The arbitrator was not required to follow the law and relied
on industry standards rather than legal standards in reaching her decision.
Therefore, there is no intentional disregard of the law. While a different result
would have obtained under legal standards, the arbitrator did not indicate she
knew what the legal standards were, so the decision was not intentional disre-
gard of the law.  So far, so good.
2. But suppose the arbitrator stated she was aware of the law but said it
was more appropriate to apply industry standards to resolve the case. The
award could be subject to vacatur under Professor Drahozal’s proposal because
the result is different than the law would have yielded and the arbitrator knew
the law and disregarded it.
3. Suppose the arbitrator heard arguments on the law but disagreed with
either, or both, sides as to its meaning or application.  While it is a closer call,
the award would probably stand because the law did not meet the test of clarity.
4. Now suppose the arbitrator knew the law, did not say she knew the
law, and proceeded to apply industry standards.  In this case, as in the first,
there is no possible challenge for manifest disregard—even though the only
difference between this and the second hypothetical is that the arbitrator was
candid about her basis for decision.
It is nonsensical for these four permutations to lead to different results
given that neither the evidence, the facts, nor the decisional standards changed.
What did change was the transparency of the arbitrator’s decision making.  As
our tradition of reasoned and written opinions in public adjudication attests, and
the recent move toward written and reasoned decisions in arbitration in this
context confirms, transparency of decision making with respect to formal dis-
putes is normatively desirable for the reasons described above.169  Yet it is
punished under Professor Drahozal’s proposal because it is that candor that
provides the basis by which a reviewing court can determine that the arbitrator
knew the law and disregarded it.
The possibility of such an absurd result leads to perverse incentives within
arbitration.  Since Professor Drahozal’s standard does not apply to mere errors
of law, but rather only upon a showing that the arbitrator knew the law and
deliberately disregarded it, arbitrators would have the incentive not to know, or
consider, the law as a factor that could influence their judgment in a particular
case.  Hear no evil, see no evil, do no evil—and at the very least, as the fourth
hypothetical suggests, speak no evil.  It is difficult to see how public policy
could support such an incentive.  While decision making in arbitration does not
necessarily have to be based on law, there is no reason law cannot be a helpful
part of the arbitrator’s decision making, and a legal rule that would encourage
arbitrators not to consider the law in order to insulate them from possible rever-
sal for manifest disregard of the law seems untenable.
169 For a discussion of the significance of transparency to democratic governance, see Reu-
ben, supra note 62, at 289-90.
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3. No Real Problem Exists
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of process
characteristics and values, Professor Drahozal’s “intentional disregard” would
undermine the finality and efficiency of the arbitration process by opening the
door to lengthy appeals that would cost parties time and money, and delay the
enforcement of the arbitral award.  It would also frustrate the prudential and
efficiency interests of the courts that Professor Drahozal’s proposal seeks to
protect.  Professor Drahozal cites no evidence to suggest that bizarre arbitration
awards are a problem worthy of congressional attention.  To the contrary, one
may rationally infer quite the opposite from the paucity of judicial decisions
accepting claims on this ground, as well as the lack of published media reports
highlighting such horrors that so often make grist for the media mill.170  Nor is
there any reason to believe that the courts would, or should, be any more favor-
ably disposed to such claims upon codification than they are with the common
law power they already claim.  Drahozal rightly recognizes the amenability of
manifest disregard review to misuse.  Yet despite the procedural safeguards
Drahozal’s proposal puts in place,171 legislative endorsement of the “inten-
tional disregard” standard may well encourage abusive challenges.  Worse yet,
it is unclear that the proposal won’t be viewed by at least some courts to lower
the bar from “manifest disregard” to “intentional disregard,” which would
likely lead to the vacatur of more arbitral awards and, ultimately, more judicial
involvement in arbitration rather than less.
It is unclear why Congress should divert scarce judicial resources away
from real problems and open the federal courthouse doors to address a problem
that may exist only rarely, if at all, when many more cases that are unlikely to
meet the standard are also likely to blow in while that door is open.  Even
setting aside the many abusive cases that we can expect to be brought by parties
seeking desperately to overturn judgments against them, it would take the
courts years of cases to parse out the answers to such legitimate questions as
the statutory meaning of “intentional” and “disregard,” how much knowledge
of the relevant law the arbitrator must have to meet the standard, whether and
the degree to which arbitral intent to disregard the law is a factor, and whether
and under what conditions the arbitrator has a duty to acquire legal knowledge.
Many other questions are almost certain to arise.
4. Tailoring Remedy to Concern
Such a burden on efficiency, finality, and other arbitration process values
can only be justified if they are outweighed by other benefits.  Drahozal’s con-
cern is with the institutional integrity of the courts, and one cannot help but be
at least somewhat sympathetic to the precarious position in which the FAA
170 In this regard, unreasonable arbitral rulings stand in conspicuous contrast to the many
news articles and judicial opinions that have described problems associated with mandatory
arbitration. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Judges’ Action Cast Shadow on Court’s Integrity,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2001, at A13; Reynolds Holding, Private Justice:  Can Public Count on
Fair Arbitration?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2001, at A15; Reynolds Holding, Private Justice:
Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at A1; Margaret A.
Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1.
171 Drahozal, supra note 4, at 248-49 (narrow definition and availability of sanctions).
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places the courts with respect to the integrity interests that Professor Drahozal
raises.  Courts have the obligation to enforce arbitral awards with no control
whatsoever over the content or integrity of those awards, and bizarre awards
can happen.
Professor Drahozal’s concern about the institutional integrity of the courts
is certainly justified.172  However, in my view, the remedy he proposes is not
well tailored to meet this concern.  The threat to the integrity of the courts is
much greater on the front end, when the court is making the substantive deci-
sion to compel arbitration, than it is on the back end, when the court is merely
enforcing an arbitral award (as it must under section 9 when the parties so
agree).
As the empirical research on procedural justice has repeatedly demon-
strated,173 trust in the courts is a function of expectations,174 and the gateway
decision of whether to compel arbitration under sections 3 or 4 is the moment at
which the expectations of the parties with respect to arbitration are met or
breached, much more so than when the arbitral award itself is enforced (which
the parties fully expect).  At the motion to compel stage, parties may have an
expectation of being able to go to court, and it is the breach of that expectation
that has the potential to erode public trust in the courts.175  This dynamic is
precisely why it is so important as a matter of policy that arbitration be pre-
mised upon actual consent, rather than the constructive or imputed consent seen
in the unilateral imposition of arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion.176
As noted above, the choice to arbitrate a dispute is one that involves a
number of trade-offs, and when one actually chooses arbitration, one is
accepting both the benefits and risks of that trade-off, and agrees to accept the
consequences of that choice.  One of the critical process choices parties make
when they choose arbitration is that the arbitrator’s decision will be final and
binding, and in most cases that the law will not necessarily be the basis for
decision by the arbitrator.177  Since this choice sets the parties’ expectation
with respect to the enforceability of the arbitral award, a decision to enforce the
award will hardly upset those expectations, even when the award is bizarre.
Indeed, one may plausibly argue that a decision not to enforce the award will
be more damaging to the public’s confidence in the system—certainly from the
172 I have written of similar concerns myself. See Reuben, supra note 62, at 304-318.
173 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom R. Tyler, Pub-
lic Mistrust of the Law:  A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 856-58 (1998).  For
a concise overview, see Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-26 (2001).
174 See Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Trust in Relationships:  A Model of
Development and Decline, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE:  ESSAYS INSPIRED BY
THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 133, 165-67 (Barbara Benedict Bunker & Jeffrey Z. Rubin
eds., 1995).
175 See Reuben, supra note 62, at 311.
176 See Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Sepa-
rability:  Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L.
REV. 819, 849-50 (2003).
177 Following this line of reasoning, one might argue that parties should be able to contract
in favor of party-contracted judicial review, as Professor Cole suggests.  However, for rea-
sons described above, I believe that parties should not be able to contract for judicial review
as a matter of policy, absent express statutory authority, which I believe would be unwise.
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perspective of the prevailing party—because of the widespread and legitimate
expectation of the consuming public that arbitration awards are final and bind-
ing.  For this reason, the loss of confidence in the courts that can arise from
compelling parties into arbitration against their will is of greater concern to the
integrity of the courts than those that can arise from making the parties abide by
the results of a process to which the parties voluntarily agreed.
D. The Underlying Problem of Mandatory Arbitration:  A Legal Process
Perspective on the Proper Role of Congress
While they differ considerably in orientation and scope, all three proposals
are haunted by the unmistakable ghost of mandatory arbitration.178
Professor Stempel predicates his argument favoring full-scale judicial
review on the proposition that “it is probably far too late to revisit (much less
reverse) the arguable judicial errors that propelled the jurisprudential sea
change in favor of mass arbitration.”179  Many have argued that one of those
errors is the courts’ willingness to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses.  Simi-
larly, Professor Cole tells us that the increased interest that parties have in judi-
cial review may be a response to society’s increased skepticism of
arbitration,180 a skepticism that may in part be born from the arrival of
mandatory arbitration and the widespread negative attention it has received in
the media.181  Professor Drahozal’s proposal to codify the manifest disregard
standard may appear more attractive when we recognize arbitral excess can
come in a proceeding in which one of the parties may have been compelled
against their will.
I agree with Professor Stempel with respect to stemming the tide in the
judiciary.  The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken very clearly about the strength
of the federal policy favoring the arbitrability of disputes and just how broadly
it reads the congressional mandate of the FAA.  Congress itself, however, is
quite another matter.  At bottom, Professor Stempel’s proposal is a response in
part to the rise and institutionalization of mandatory arbitration.  If we are
going to have such a regime, Stempel argues, then we need to ensure substan-
tive and procedural fairness to the parties, in part so as not to raise the skepti-
cism, or threat of skepticism, that concerns Professors Cole and Drahozal.
In my view, however, Congress should deal with the problem more
directly.  That is to say, rather than enacting band-aid solutions to deal with the
wounds caused by the Supreme Court’s improper exploitation of the FAA,
Congress should deal with the underlying problem of mandatory arbitration,
178 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 83, 105-10 (1996) (explaining the confusion and controversy over the use of
the terms “voluntary” and “mandatory” in the employment-arbitration context); see also Ste-
phen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional
Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003) (“I ask Professor Sternlight (and others)
to stop calling contractual arbitration—mandatory arbitration.”).  For a response and an
alternative history of the controversial term, see Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration:  Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005) (“[T]his Article will con-
tinue to call the process ‘mandatory’ arbitration.”).
179 Stempel, supra note 4, at 257.
180 Cole, supra note 4, at 216.
181 See supra note 170.
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making clear in commercial contexts characterized by power disparities—such
as consumer, employment, and franchisee cases—that arbitrations conducted
under the Act will be voluntary and that waivers of trial rights by virtue of an
enforceable arbitration clause must be “clear and unmistakable.”182  From a
legal process perspective, this is a decision for the Congress, not the courts, and
it is time for the Congress to reclaim its legacy.
A central tenet of legal process theory is that decision making in a legal
regime should be allocated to the decision maker most competent to make that
decision.183  At the risk of some oversimplification, courts are generally seen as
having a high degree of competence to decide questions of law.184  Administra-
tive agencies, by contrast, are seen as having greater competence to decide
matters that call for technical expertise or sophistication.185  Finally, as repre-
sentative bodies, legislatures are seen as having special competence to resolve
questions of policy about which reasonable minds will disagree and which can
only be resolved in a democracy on majoritarian grounds.186
The question of mandatory arbitration represents such a policy choice:
that of diverting formalized disputes away from courts and the law, and into
arbitral proceedings.187  To the extent that decision is to authorize the use of
mandatory arbitration, it represents the policy conclusion that the institutional
efficiency gains realized by mandatory arbitration through the reduction of dis-
pute resolution obligations of the judiciary outweigh the rights of individuals to
access the law and the courts.  Regardless of one’s views on the merits, this
clearly would be a rational policy choice, and one with which the law arguably
has some remote experience.188
Assuming such a policy choice is constitutional,189 the question from a
legal process perspective is which branch is most competent to make it?  In the
U.S, this policy choice has been made by the judiciary, which has at least tac-
itly endorsed mandatory arbitration in a number of cases.190  Yet legal process
182 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Techs.,
Inc. v. Comm’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
183 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107
HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994) (describing institutional competence as one of the
“great legal process concept[s]”).
184 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163-64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
185 See id. at 165-67; see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-47
(1938).
186 See HART & SACKS, supra note 184, at 164-65.
187 See Steven Walt, Decision by Division:  The Contractarian Structure of Commercial
Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 369 (1999) (discussing allocation of responsibilities
between courts and arbitrators).
188 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test
for determining due process rights in informal administrative adjudications).
189 For a discussion of Seventh Amendment issues, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Bind-
ing Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 13 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001).
190 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (age discrimina-
tion claim subject to compulsory arbitration under arbitration clause of securities registration
application required by employer); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (securities fraud claims under the 1933 Act and under RICO may be compelled to
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theory would indicate that this is precisely the type of question that should be
decided by the legislature.191  It is a fundamental question of what the law
should be on an issue of significant public policy that affects broad and diverse
interests and which is “heavily laden . . . with value judgments and policy
assessments.”192  Legislative determination allows for democratic participation
in the policy-making process and for the various arguments for and against
mandatory arbitration to be tested against the mettle of counter-argument as
competing interests deliberate toward a consensus.193  Further, legislators
responsible for making the choice are subject to ongoing and closely proximate
accountability.194
Unelected federal courts, by contrast, have no special competence to bring
to the policy question of whether statutory and other non-constitutional claims
should be arbitrated rather than decided by courts.195  To the contrary, one of
the central democracy-enhancing competencies of the courts, neutrality, is actu-
ally compromised in this context because of the courts’ institutional stake in the
outcome.196  Courts have a vested institutional interest in managing the size of
their dockets, and individual judges may have ideological preferences that
would cause them to steer certain cases or classes of cases into arbitration
arbitration where the brokerage agreement includes a mandatory arbitration clause); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (questions of validity of
contract with arbitration provision to be decided by arbitrators, not courts).
191 See HALE, supra note 132, at 541-49 (“Popularly elected legislative bodies would thus
seem to be the organs best suited to make the final choices which government at times has to
make between conflicting liberties . . . .”).
192 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 414 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Way-
man v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 43 (1825) (noting that legislature may not delegate
certain “important subjects”).
193 This is not to suggest that all outcomes of a democratic legislative process are necessa-
rily democratic, as the rise of Nazi Germany so clearly attests. See Matthew Lippman, Law,
Lawyers, and Legality in the Third Reich:  The Perversion of Principle and Professionalism,
11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 199 (1997); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1980) (responding to the critique).
194 As a matter of U.S. constitutional law, such a choice would appear to be well within
Congress’ Article I powers.  Few would argue that Congress lacks the power to create a
statutory right that could only be vindicated through an arbitral forum rather than a judicial
forum.  It is less clear whether Congress could delegate this adjudicatory authority wholly to
private arbitrators. See, e.g.,  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
840 (1986) (holding that judicial review by Article III courts preserves constitutionality of
arbitration procedures in Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
195 This is a determination of policy, of what the law should be, rather than an articulation
and application of the law. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-50 (1994); Richard L. Hasen,
The “Political Market” Metaphor and Election Law:  A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes,
50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 730 (1998) (Courts lack “a yardstick for measuring appropriate politi-
cal competition either between party and nonparty political actors or among nonparty
actors.”).
196 One of the bedrock principles of due process is the right to have one’s legal claims
decided by an impartial tribunal. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)
(impartial tribunal an element of due process); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-32 (1927)
(holding that conviction by mayor of village who stood to receive portion of fine collected
was denial of defendant’s right to due process). See generally KOMESAR, supra note 195, at
141-42; Reuben, supra note 55, at 1055-70.
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rather than permitting them to proceed before judges or juries.197  In the end,
judicial resolution of this issue gives rise to precisely the kind of judicial value
imposition—judicial activism—that legal process theory abhors.198
The resolution of the mandatory arbitration question plainly falls within
the purview of Congress.  Further, making clear that arbitration under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act must be voluntary resolves many of the concerns that lead
Professor Stempel to call for substantive judicial review of arbitration awards.
Parties choosing arbitration would simply be forsaking substantive review for
accurate application of the law in favor of the other benefits of arbitration.
Thus these concerns devolve down to where they belong:  party choice, an ani-
mating principle in arbitration, just as it is in other dispute resolution processes.
CONCLUSION
Innovation in dispute resolution is a good thing, generally speaking.  How-
ever, it does have the potential to blur the lines between processes, leading to
party confusion and uncertain legal outcomes.  This does not mean that we
need to constrain innovation.  It does, however, oblige greater clarity in the
distinction between processes.  Such clarity may be achieved by analyzing prin-
cipal dispute resolution processes according to their primary characteristics and
values, and then making a similar assessment of the adapted process.  Where
the differences are not significant, it seems reasonable to consider the adapted
process a derivative of the primary process.  On the other hand, if the differ-
ences are great, then it seems more reasonable to treat the adapted process as a
new, albeit hybrid, dispute resolution process.
Displacing finality with substantive judicial review is an example of an
adaption of commercial arbitration that calls for separate treatment.  Finality is
a cornerstone of the arbitration process, making efficiency and other arbitration
process virtues possible and distinguishing arbitration from other dispute reso-
lution processes.
Displacing finality with substantive judicial review would produce a pro-
cess that frustrates rather than furthers traditional arbitration values, one that is
more inefficient than efficient, complex rather than simple, formal rather than
informal, law-bound rather than flexible in decisional norms.  This is not com-
mercial arbitration as it has been historically understood and as it has been
embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act.  From a process characteristic and
value perspective, such a process should not be considered arbitration for pur-
poses of the FAA because of the inevitability of confusion of consumers of
arbitration services.199  Moreover, such arbitrations should not get the substan-
tial supports that the Federal Arbitration Act provides to commercial arbitra-
197 See MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 172-73 (The U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration jurispru-
dence is based on its vested interest in “docket-clearing pure and simple.”); Laura A. Kaster
& Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at
15, 16 (“[J]udges have a vested interest in reducing the workload of the courts, and they may
attempt to advance that agenda without sensitivity to the impact on the system as a
whole . . . .”).
198 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
199 This is not to suggest that parties should not be able to draft arbitration provisions that
include substantive judicial review.  The principle of autonomy in dispute resolution is a
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tions conducted under its authority:  enforcement of the initial agreement to
arbitrate, support of arbitrators during the arbitration process, and enforcement
of the arbitral award.
The 1925 Federal Arbitration Act wisely preserved the core process char-
acteristics and values of the commercial arbitration process in purpose, lan-
guage, and structure.  Arbitration may have evolved, but it has not changed so
dramatically to justify Congress changing the fundamental structure of the pro-
cess by displacing finality with substantive judicial review.  Rather, Congress
should continue to support parties in their initial choice to arbitrate their dis-
pute, and hold them to that choice.  In choosing to arbitrate, parties agree to
take a dispute out of the public adjudication process and to have it decided
privately according to other process characteristics and virtues.  It is incoherent
to require or invite them to bring the dispute back into the public system after
private adjudication, and paternalistic for the law to disallow awards that are
manifestly different than the result that would obtain at law.  To the extent
parties seek substantive review, private arbitral appeals processes are more than
adequate to preserve party self-determination and accuracy of result within the
structural constraints of the arbitration process as it is commonly known.
Moreover, such private review neither distorts the traditional process of arbitra-
tion nor burdens the courts with a multitude of questions that will require
answering on a case-by-case basis under these proposals.
Rather than endorsing substantive judicial review, Congress should take
the rare opportunity to amend the FAA to strengthen the core values of arbitra-
tion by making it clear that parties may not contract for substantive judicial
review.  More significantly, perhaps, Congress should mandate that arbitration
under the FAA is always based on the actual consent of the parties, disallowing
predispute agreements to arbitrate under the act.  Finally, Congress should use
the process characteristics and values of arbitration to make certain that other
changes it makes further, rather than undermine, the core process characteris-
tics and values that give commercial arbitration its distinct character as a dis-
pute resolution process.
cardinal virtue.  However, it does mean that such arbitrations not be considered arbitration
for purposes of the benefits of the Federal Arbitration Act.
